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MYTHS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Albert C. Lin *
Abstract
Environmental law is pervaded by myths—i.e., assumptions that are
inaccurate, misleading, or false. These myths arise in various contexts,
ranging from wetlands mitigation schemes and pollution credit trading
programs to legal regimes premised on the concept of sustainability. This
Article explores several myths of environmental law, their origins, and
their roles. While political reasons explain in part the creation and
prevalence of these myths, more is at work behind these myths than mere
politics or failures to implement the law. The myths of environmental law
facilitate the management of ecologically complex systems by providing
a reductionist account of them. Beyond that, these myths serve important
expressive functions in communicating social attitudes and values,
legitimating social institutions and practices, and maintaining social
solidarity. Awareness of myth’s roles in environmental law can enable
society to address legal shortcomings that are thereby revealed and to
reject or replace those myths that undermine environmental law’s goals.
I. INTRODUCTION
Environmental law is pervaded by myths and half-truths. By this, I mean that a
number of its regulatory regimes rest on assumptions or beliefs that are inaccurate,
unlikely, or arguably false. Perhaps the most obvious example—one that has been
the subject of much recent scholarly handwringing—is the goal of sustainability,
which plays an especially prominent role in international environmental law but
often appears in domestic environmental discourse as well. At best, the concept of
sustainability represents a lofty, though unrealistic, goal. At worst, it is a deceptive
device that further entrenches existing practices of production and consumption.
Whereas sustainability remains largely an animating principle rather than a
legal mandate, other myths are expressed more directly and explicitly in
environmental law. For example, several statutes mandate regulation of
environmental harms without regard to economic costs. The implementation of these
statutes strays from these mandates, however, and calls into question the feasibility
of cost-blind regulation. Another widespread myth minimizes the role of individuals
*
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in causing environmental problems. Many environmental statutes focus instead on
industrial polluters. In doing so, these statutes neglect the contribution of individuals
to environmental harm and thereby perpetuate the myth that pollution from
individuals and other sources is negligible.
Other prominent myths involve frequently used environmental policy tools
such as mitigation programs and pollution credits. Ideally, mitigation compensates
for environmentally damaging activities such as the destruction of wetlands or
habitat. However, scholars often have serious doubts as to whether mitigation truly
compensates for the harm caused. Likewise, pollution credits theoretically represent
the avoidance of pollution that would otherwise have occurred, and the trading of
these credits within cap-and-trade regimes promises more cost-effective pollution
reductions than might be achieved under command-and-control regulation. In the
context of climate change, however, the efficacy of cap-and-trade regimes in
actually reducing carbon emissions—and the validity of some carbon credits—has
come into serious doubt.
On occasion, commentators have considered individual environmental myths
and proposed explanations for their existence. 1 But to date there has been no
systematic analysis of these myths or their implications. This Article explores
several prominent myths of environmental law and their possible functions. In
addition to the more obvious political reasons for the persistence of these myths,
these myths often serve important expressive functions. Furthermore, though the
term myth often has a negative connotation, it is important to remember that the laws
in which environmental myths are embedded have dramatically reduced pollution,
improved environmental quality, and protected valued resources. This Article thus
considers the potential value of myth and suggests reforms to bring about a more
effective and forthright system of environmental law.
Part II introduces six prominent myths of environmental law that arise in a
variety of contexts. Part III considers the inaccuracies or failures that generate these
myths. The myths of environmental law may involve shortcomings in implementing
the law as well as conceptual flaws in the law itself. Part IV looks to sociology and
anthropology for insights into the roles of myths more generally. Myths are not
merely a form of primitive science, but perform important functions even in
contemporary, complex societies. Part V applies the insights from the study of myths
to the myths of environmental law. The analysis in this part reveals that
environmental law’s myths, like classical myths, explain complexities of the world
around us, express social values, and legitimize legal arrangements and economic
systems. Finally, Part VI considers implications for designing and implementing
environmental law going forward.

1

See, e.g., William H. Rodgers, Jr., Deception, Self-Deception, and Myth: Evaluating
Long-Term Environmental Settlements, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 567, 573–75 (1995).
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II. SIX PROMINENT MYTHS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
This Part introduces six areas of environmental law in which myths play a
prominent role: wetlands mitigation schemes, pollution credit trading programs, risk
assessment, legal standards that purport to regulate without regard to cost, regulatory
programs that focus on industrial pollution sources, and sustainable development.
The widespread presence of myths in environmental law suggests that their
occurrence is not merely accidental and merits closer examination.
A. Wetlands Mitigation
Environmental mitigation refers to efforts to compensate for the negative
effects human activities have on the environment. Mitigation programs may address
the loss of specific environmental amenities, such as open space or habitat,2 or the
general environmental effects of a proposed project.3 Such programs may require
project proponents to undertake compensatory measures directly or to pay fees to
support such measures.
Wetlands mitigation provides a leading example of such programs. Wetlands
perform important ecological functions, including moderating floods, filtering
wastes, and providing habitat for numerous species. 4 Federal wetlands protection
occurs primarily through the Clean Water Act (CWA), which requires a property
owner to obtain a Section 404 permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(Corps) prior to “the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters
at specified disposal sites.” 5 The Corps may not issue a permit “if there is a
2
See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2) (2012) (authorizing issuance of incidental take permits
under the Endangered Species Act where applicants have prepared a habitat conservation
plan specifying steps to minimize and mitigate impacts on protected species); Fred
Bosselman, Swamp Swaps: The “Second Nature” of Wetlands, 39 ENVTL. L. 577, 591–92
(2009) (discussing species conservation banks); David C. Levy & Jessica Owley Lippmann,
Preservation as Mitigation Under CEQA: Ho Hum or Uh-Oh?, ENVTL. L. NEWS, Summer
2005, at 18, 18–19 (discussing the two most common forms of mitigation).
3
See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014) (requiring
mitigation under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)). While the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) does not contain a substantive mitigation requirement
equivalent to that found in CEQA, a federal agency may avoid having to prepare a full-blown
environmental impact statement if it adopts mitigation measures sufficient to avoid
significant effects, referred to as a “mitigated FONSI.” See Final Guidance for Federal
Departments and Agencies on the Appropriate Use of Mitigation and Monitoring and
Clarifying the Appropriate Use of Mitigated Findings of No Significant Impact, 76 Fed. Reg.
3843, 3848 (Jan. 21, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500–02, 1505–08).
4
HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND
READINGS 381–82 (6th ed. 2012); Philip Womble & Martin Doyle, The Geography of
Trading Ecosystem Services: A Case Study of Wetland and Stream Compensatory Mitigation
Markets, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 229, 238–45 (2012).
5
33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012).
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practicable alternative to the proposed discharge which would have less adverse
impact on the aquatic ecosystem.” 6 Furthermore, the proposed discharge may not
“cause or contribute to significant degradation of the waters of the United States,”7
and the applicant must take “appropriate and practicable steps . . . [to] minimize
potential adverse impacts of the discharge on the aquatic ecosystem.” 8 Finally, the
applicant must compensate for those impacts that remain by replacing or providing
substitute wetland habitat. 9 Together, these requirements constitute a “mitigation
sequence” for permit applicants to follow: avoidance of impacts, minimization of
unavoidable impacts, and compensation. 10
Since 1989, the United States has maintained a goal of “no net loss” of wetlands
acreage and function. 11 If a proposed action will have unavoidable adverse impacts
on aquatic resources, the government requires compensatory mitigation to ensure
the no net loss goal is met. 12 Although the mitigation sequence prioritizes avoidance
and minimization of adverse impacts over compensatory mitigation, landowners
frequently opt for compensatory mitigation first. 13 Such mitigation may involve
restoring a previously existing wetland, enhancing an existing wetland’s functions,
preserving an existing wetland, or creating a new wetland. 14 A permittee may fulfill
its mitigation responsibilities by conducting the mitigation itself or by contributing
toward offsite mitigation through a mitigation bank or in-lieu fee mitigation
program. 15
Unfortunately, compensatory mitigation has failed to achieve the no net loss
objective. A 2001 study by the National Research Council (NRC) concluded as
much, notwithstanding the fact that the wetlands permits on paper required 1.8 acres
6

40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (2013).
Id. § 230.10(c).
8
Id. § 230.10(d).
9
See id. § 230.75(d).
10
Palmer Hough & Morgan Robertson, Mitigation Under Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act: Where It Comes From, What It Means, 17 WETLANDS ECOLOGY & MGMT. 15,
18–19 (2009); Memorandum of Agreement Between the Dep’t of the Army and the Envtl.
Prot. Agency, The Determination of Mitigation Under the Clean Water Act Section 404(b)(1)
Guidelines (Feb. 6, 1990), available at http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/
wetlands/mitigate.cfm, archived at http://perma.cc/S7K-9S6H. Even if these requirements
are met, the Corps may deny a permit if the proposed activity is contrary to the public interest,
33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) (2014), and the EPA may veto a Corps-issued permit for activities
having unacceptable adverse effects on the environment, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2012). The
practice of mitigation grew out of these agencies’ respective unwillingness to exercise their
authority to deny or veto permits. See Hough & Robertson, supra at 17.
11
DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 4, at 382.
12
Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594,
19,594 (Apr. 10, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 230).
13
See Bonnie Malloy, Symbolic Gestures or Our Saving Grace: The Relevance of
Compensatory Mitigation for Florida’s Wetlands in the Climate Change Era, 27 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 103, 117 (2011); Bosselman, supra note 2, at 582–83.
14
Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. at 19,594.
15
Id. at 19,594–95.
7
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to be mitigated for every acre lost. 16 Factors contributing to this failure include
unclear standards, standards that focus on easily measured parameters rather than
overall viability, and inadequate implementation and enforcement. 17 For example,
more readily constructed open-water areas are often used to compensate for the loss
of saturated or intermittently inundated wetlands, even though each of these wetland
types tends to contain different species and perform different ecological functions. 18
Summarizing the results of earlier studies, the NRC concluded that only “[b]etween
70% and 76% of the mitigation required in the permits is implemented, . . . about
50% to 53% of the implemented mitigation projects did not meet the permit
requirements[, and] the estimate of functional equivalency of mitigation wetland
was about 20% of that intended.” 19
The federal government responded to the NRC study by issuing new
regulations adopting many of the study’s recommendations. 20 Mitigation is to be
“based on what is practicable and capable of compensating for the aquatic resource
functions that will be lost as a result of the permitted activity,” 21 and mitigation plans
must contain ecologically based performance standards.22 The new rules also
establish a preference for the use of mitigation banks, as opposed to in-lieu fee
programs or permittee-responsible mitigation. Mitigation banks are offsite
conservation areas designed to replace destroyed wetland resources; because their
establishment typically occurs prior to wetlands destruction, they are considered to
be less environmentally risky. 23 Moreover, they enable the consolidation of
resources, expertise, and monitoring efforts in connection with large, ecologically
valuable parcels. 24
One commentator nonetheless has criticized the new rules for allowing “far too
much discretion . . . to allow mitigation to occur” instead of avoidance or

16

NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE
CLEAN WATER ACT 2–3 (2001).
17
See id. at 95–108.
18
See id. at 106.
19
Id. at 120; see also Royal C. Gardner et al., Compensating for Wetland Losses Under
the Clean Water Act (Redux): Evaluating the Federal Compensatory Mitigation Regulation,
38 STETSON L. REV. 213, 219 nn.35–40 (2009) (citing studies exploring various mitigation
methods).
20
Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. at 19,594;
see also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136,
§ 314(b), 117 Stat. 1392, 1431 (2003) (mandating issuance of these regulations).
21
33 C.F.R. § 332.3(a)(1) (2013).
22
Id. § 332.5(a).
23
See Jessica Owley, The Increasing Privatization of Environmental Permitting, 46
AKRON L. REV. 1091, 1108–10 (2013).
24
33 C.F.R. § 332.3(a)(1); Owley, supra note 23, at 1110. Empirical data, however,
suggests that mitigation banks may not be more effective than mitigation performed by
permittees. See Rebecca L. Kihslinger, Success of Wetland Mitigation Projects, NAT’L
WETLANDS NEWSL., Mar.–Apr. 2008, at 14, 15.
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minimization. 25 Further, the rules arguably “include[] too few safeguards to ensure
that mitigation serves to successfully compensate for lost functions and values of
impacted waters.” 26 For example, the rules allow preservation of wetlands other than
the ones under permit to serve as compensatory mitigation where, among other
conditions, the resources to be preserved have important ecological functions. 27
Preservation of valuable wetlands can be a critical objective. However, by definition,
preservation creates no new resources to compensate for destroyed wetlands. 28 Nor
does it even enhance or restore existing resources. 29 Accepting preservation as a
form of mitigation thus runs counter to the basic principle that mitigation should
compensate for destroyed or damaged resources. Finally, although the full effects of
the new rules remain to be seen, the Corps’ past reluctance to deny permit
applications 30 also warrants concern because it foreshadows a continuing failure to
apply and enforce standards designed to protect the environment.
In many instances, mitigation does not truly compensate for ecological harm.
Wetlands mitigation schemes assume that wetlands are fungible, yet ecological
complexity calls into question this assumption. In addition, to the extent these
schemes accept preservation as a form of mitigation, they require no compensation
at all. Ultimately, the shortcomings of wetlands mitigation programs make it
unlikely that the no net loss goal will be achieved.
B. Pollution Credit Trading Programs
Pollution credit trading programs rest on an assumption similar to that
underlying wetlands mitigation: pollution emissions are fungible. Although this
25
James Murphy et al., New Mitigation Rule Promises More of the Same: Why the New
Corps and EPA Mitigation Rule Will Fail to Protect Our Aquatic Resources Adequately, 38
STETSON L. REV. 311, 313 (2009).
26
Id.
27
33 C.F.R. § 332.3(h). Among these conditions are requirements that the preserved
resources be “under threat of destruction or adverse modifications” and that the preserved
site “be permanently protected.” Id. § 332.3(h)(1)(iv)–(v).
28
See Murphy et al., supra note 25, at 332–33; see also Levy & Lippmann, supra note
2, at 19 (criticizing preservation as a form of mitigation because preservation “admits that
destruction of the amenity will occur,” “results in an overall net loss in the amenity,” and
only “seeks to prevent future harm”). The use of preservation as a form of mitigation under
CEQA illustrates a similar dynamic. Under CEQA, projects requiring agency approval must
incorporate feasible mitigation measures. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002 (West 2007 & Supp.
2014); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15092, 15096(h) (2014). CEQA’s implementing
regulations define mitigation to include the preservation of offsite resources. Id. § 15370.
Preservation is a commonly used method to meet CEQA mitigation requirements,
notwithstanding the fact that preservation does not actually mitigate the present harms of a
proposed project. See Levy & Lippmann, supra note 2, at 20.
29
See Murphy et al., supra note 25, at 332.
30
See Malloy, supra note 13, at 119–20 (noting that over 12,000 permits were issued
and only one permit was denied between 1999 and 2003); Hough & Robertson, supra note
10, at 27 (reporting a 0.25% denial rate in 2004 and 2005).
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assumption may be less problematic than in the wetlands context, these programs
nevertheless are subject to controversy.
In the last two decades, cap-and-trade programs have become an increasingly
popular mechanism for regulating air pollution. 31 The key selling point behind capand-trade schemes is the promise to yield pollution reductions more cost effectively
than conventional command-and-control regulation. Cap-and-trade programs
require sources of pollution to possess pollution allowances in a quantity equivalent
to the amount of pollution they emit. A program caps the total quantity of
allowances, and program administrators distribute allowances to pollution sources
either for free or via auction. A source may then purchase or sell allowances, and its
decisions will depend on a comparison of allowance prices with the source’s cost of
reducing emissions directly.
Cap-and-trade programs frequently allow pollution sources to satisfy program
requirements by using offsets in lieu of allowances. 32 Offsets are typically generated
when sources outside the cap-and-trade program reduce their pollution. 33 Once these
reductions are verified, the sources receive offset credits that may be used or sold
like allowances. 34
Emission trading programs pose substantial challenges for enforcement:
program effectiveness hinges on accurate emissions data, which is often difficult if
not impossible to come by. 35 To make matters worse, the financial gains made
possible by allowance trading create incentives for fraud. 36 These challenges expand
when pollution sources are allowed to use offsets to satisfy program requirements. 37
The inclusion of offsets complicates the already demanding tasks of monitoring and
verification because offsets originate from sources whose emissions tend to be
especially difficult and costly to measure. Sources of offsets may include, for
example, small-scale polluters not subject to emissions monitoring, as well as
forestry, ranching, and other land-use activities whose emissions are not readily
quantified. 38 They also may include sources located outside the jurisdiction of the
agency that oversees the emissions trading program. 39 Unfortunately, offset
31

See Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade: Moving
Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 396 (2009).
32
Lesley K. McAllister, The Enforcement Challenge of Cap-and-Trade Regulation, 40
ENVTL. L. 1195, 1216 (2010).
33
Id. Offsets may also be generated by projects that sequester pollution. See id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 1197–1216.
36
Id. at 1200–02.
37
Id. at 1216–17.
38
Id.; see, e.g., Compliance Offset Program, AIR RESOURCES BOARD,
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/offsets/offsets.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/V9
E3-X7LE (last visited Aug. 27, 2014) (describing California’s adoption of carbon offset
protocols governing forest and livestock projects, and elimination of ozone depleting
substances).
39
David M. Driesen, Linkage and Multilevel Governance, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L
L. 389, 402–03 (2009). Cap-and-trade programs have also been plagued by a tendency to
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programs can even undermine pollution reduction goals by “encourag[ing] project
hosts to gain credit when net emissions happen to be declining (whether or not they
are actually declining due to some additional effort) but leav[ing] the source
unregulated when net emissions are rising.” 40
Notwithstanding these concerns, cap-and-trade programs addressing
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have been adopted internationally (under the
Kyoto Protocol), regionally (within the European Union), nationally (e.g., by
Norway), 41 and subnationally (e.g., by California in its implementation of AB 32). 42
The stated appeal of these schemes is their ability to generate cost-effective
emissions reductions. The extent to which these programs have actually reduced
carbon emissions is open to debate, however. Indeed, their continued use despite
accompanying doubts suggests that their appeal derives from appearing to tackle the
problem while avoiding more onerous, systemic changes that might be necessary.
The Kyoto Protocol presents perhaps the most prominent example of the
difficulties faced by carbon trading schemes. Under the Kyoto Protocol,
industrialized nations—but not developing countries—committed to reduce their
GHG emissions during a five-year commitment period (2008–2012) by
approximately five percent from 1990 emission levels. 43 On paper, the agreement
pushed nations primarily to reduce emissions themselves by requiring that any
emissions trading be “supplemental to domestic actions.” 44 However, the Protocol
contained several “flexibility mechanisms” designed to ease compliance, including
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and emissions trading. These
mechanisms have proven critical to fulfilling industrialized nations’ commitments.
The offset system created by the CDM has had especially troubling effects. The
CDM was intended to foster sustainable development in developing countries while
reducing industrialized countries’ compliance costs. 45 Under the CDM,
industrialized nations may obtain carbon credits (“certified emission reductions”)
for funding activities in developing countries that reduce GHG emissions. 46 These
credits essentially substitute carbon-reducing projects in developing countries for

over-allocate allowances, a problem that can defeat the purpose of these programs.
McAllister, supra note 31, at 410–11.
40
Michael W. Wara & David G. Victor, A Realistic Policy on International Carbon
Offsets 15 (Program on Energy & Sustainable Dev., Working Paper No. 74, 2008).
41
Judson Jaffe et al., Linking Tradable Permit Systems: A Key Element of Emerging
International Climate Policy Architecture, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 789, 793 (2009) (noting that
Norway operated its own emissions trading system before joining the European Union
Emission Trading System in 2008).
42
See Ann E. Carlson, Regulatory Capacity and State Environmental Leadership:
California’s Climate Policy, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 63, 70–75 (2013).
43
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
art. 3.1 & Annex B, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
44
Id. art. 16 bis.
45
Id. art. 12.2.
46
Id. art. 12.3.
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commitments to reduce existing emissions in industrialized nations. 47 Ensuring that
CDM projects actually produce a net reduction in emissions is essential to the
integrity of the system, especially as the Kyoto Protocol placed no limit on the
number of carbon credits that may be generated through the CDM. 48
As an example of a CDM project, investment in switching a coal-fueled power
plant in China to natural gas would generate certified credits if it can be shown that
the project reduces emissions. These reductions must be real and additional to what
would have happened in the absence of such investment. However, determining
whether an activity and any associated emissions reductions are real and additional
is controversial and problematic. 49 In the power plant example, it may be impossible
to determine whether the switch to natural gas would have occurred in the absence
of the CDM. Such a determination requires a hypothetical inquiry that has proven to
be extremely susceptible to manipulation. Host governments, project investors, and
third-party verifiers, on which the system relies, all face incentives—whether in
gathering data, analyzing information, or certifying projects—that favor project
approval. 50
Indeed, implementation of the CDM has increased net GHG emissions in some
instances. Most notoriously, the easy availability of carbon credits prompted
manufacturers of coolant gases (which happen to be powerful GHGs) to
dramatically increase coolant production for the sole purpose of destroying waste
gases (which are even more powerful GHGs), thereby generating carbon credits. 51
47

Gernot Klepper, The Future of the European Emission Trading System and the Clean
Development Mechanism in a Post-Kyoto World, 33 ENERGY ECON. 687, 696 (2011).
48
See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 43, at art. 12; David Campbell et al., After Cancun:
The Impossibility of Carbon Trading, 29 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 163, 171 (2010).
49
Lambert Schneider, Assessing the Additionality of CDM Projects: Practical
Experiences and Lessons Learned, 9 CLIMATE POL’Y 242, 243–47, 250 (2009); Wara &
Victor, supra note 40, at 8 (“At root, the CDM and other offset schemes are unable to
determine reliably whether credits are issued for activities that would have happened anyway
while also keeping transaction costs under control and assuring investor certainty.”).
50
Wara & Victor, supra note 40, at 11. The problems encountered in ensuring the
additionality and legitimacy of offsets are not limited to the CDM. The offset portion of
California’s carbon cap-and-trade program has prompted similar concerns. See Alan Ramo,
The California Offset Game: Who Wins and Who Loses?, 20 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 109, 123–29 (2014).
51
Elisabeth Rosenthal & Andrew W. Lehren, Profits on Carbon Credits Drive Output
TIMES,
Aug.
8,
2012,
of
a
Harmful
Gas,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/09/world/asia/incentive-to-slow-climate-change-drivesoutput-of-harmful-gases.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/3UPM4UZK; Campbell et al., supra note 48, at 179–81 (noting that the majority of credits
generated under the CDM have involved destruction of HFC23, a by-product of refrigerant
production with an extremely high global warming potential—and a correspondingly high
value for purposes of generating emission credits); see also Barry D. Solomon & Michael K.
Heiman, Integrity of the Emerging Global Markets in Greenhouse Gases, 100 ANNALS
ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 973, 978 (2010) (discussing problems encountered in verifying
and certifying emission reductions under the CDM).
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These operations are responsible for nearly half of all credits awarded under the
CDM, and efforts to rein them in have been stymied by concerns that manufacturers
will release the waste gases directly into the atmosphere if they are not paid to
destroy them. 52
Another flexibility mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, emissions trading, has
likewise undermined emissions reduction efforts. In particular, the shrinking of the
economies in the former Soviet Republics and Eastern Europe left these nations with
numerous excess allowances to sell, sometimes referred to as “hot air” allowances.53
Although some countries have shunned the use of these hot air allowances to meet
their Kyoto obligations, other nations have relied on them to avoid drastic cuts of
their own. 54 Indeed, so many of these allowances were left over after the original
Kyoto commitment period that they became the subject of contentious
negotiations. 55 Although the developed countries collectively met their pledged
Kyoto reductions, their emissions were not much lower than they would have been
in the absence of Kyoto, thanks to emissions trading and the global economic
downturn. 56
Carbon trading programs ultimately rest on two key assumptions: that
emissions are fungible and that calculated emissions reductions represent actual
emissions reductions. The first assumption—that emissions are fungible—is
relatively unproblematic. In contrast to wetlands, whose value and function depend
on their location and unique characteristics, the effects of carbon emissions are

52

See Rosenthal & Lehren, supra note 51.
See Elizabeth Lokey Aldrich & Cassandra L. Koerner, Unveiling Assigned Amount
Unit (AAU) Trades: Current Market Impacts and Prospects for the Future, 3 ATMOSPHERE
229, 231 (2012). Each party subject to binding emission limits under the Kyoto Protocol is
issued one Assigned Amount Unit (AAU) for each metric ton of carbon dioxide it is allowed
to emit. See id. at 229–30.
54
Aldrich & Koerner, supra note 53, at 232–34; Quirin Schiermeier, Hot Air, 491
NATURE 656, 656–57 (2012). The Kyoto Protocol did not place any limit on the trading of
AAUs other than to insist that emissions trading be a supplemental means for parties to meet
their emission limits. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 43, at art. 16 bis. In contrast, the European
Union has placed limits on members’ abilities to rely on offsets from the CDM and another
of Kyoto’s project mechanisms, Joint Implementation. On average, parties can meet up to
13.5% of their allocations by surrendering credits from these programs. Raphael Trotignon,
Combining Cap-and-Trade with Offsets: Lessons from CER Use in the EU ETS in 2008 and
2009, at 5 (Climate Econ. Chair Publ’ns, Working Paper Series No. 2011-03, 2011),
available at http://www.chaireeconomieduclimat.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/11-0119-Trotignon-Use-of-Offsets-in-the-EU-ETS-CEC1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/TSG38VNP; Matthew Ranson & Robert N. Stavins, Post-Durban Climate Policy Architecture
Based on Linkage of Cap-and-Trade Systems, 13 CHI. J. INT’L L. 403, 416, 437 (2013).
55
See, e.g., Barbara Lewis, EU Environment Ministers Clash Over ‘Hot Air,’ REUTERS
(Oct.
25,
2012,
5:34
PM),
http://www.trust.org/item/20121025173400nhe7g/?source=search, archived at http://perma.cc/887E-RAHM.
56
Aldrich & Koerner, supra note 53, at 231, 239; Schiermeier, supra note 54, at 657.
53
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independent of their locale. 57 However, the second assumption—that calculated
emissions reductions represent actual emissions reductions—is tenuous, particularly
when it comes to offsets. Additionality is essential to ensuring that actual net
reductions in pollution occur, yet has proven almost impossible to ensure. Moreover,
hot air allowances and other accounting maneuvers call into question the sincerity
of the international community in addressing climate change.
Generally speaking, pollution trading systems and other market-based
mechanisms tap into fundamental beliefs regarding private property rights,
utilitarianism, and virtues of the free market. 58 These beliefs do not constitute myths
themselves so much as a system of values—values that are contested not only within
environmental policy circles but also in society more broadly. But just as classical
myths reflected and reinforced societal values in ancient societies, the mythology of
pollution trading systems likewise bolsters market-oriented values today.
C. Risk Assessment
In systematizing the exchange of wetlands and pollution credits, mitigation and
pollution trading schemes attempt to quantify phenomena that may not be readily
subject to quantification. Such quantification reaches an extreme in risk assessment,
the process of characterizing the probability and magnitude of potential harms from
an event or occurrence. 59 Chemical risk assessment, for example, identifies potential
hazards, estimates the probability and magnitude of injury at different exposure
levels, and analyzes the likelihood of exposure. 60 The risk assessment process
ultimately generates a risk characterization, which ideally includes a range of
estimates to quantify identified hazards. Policymakers use the information generated
by risk assessments to make risk management decisions ranging from inaction or
further study to regulation or prohibition. 61
Risk assessment is at the heart of many environmental statutes and regulatory
actions. For example, risk assessment plays an important role in the setting of air
pollution standards by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which
examines whether pollutants endanger the public health or cause adverse effects on
public welfare. 62 Risk assessment is also central to the regulation of toxic substances
57
In some circumstances, however, co-pollutants that are emitted along with carbon
can have locally concentrated effects. See Ramo, supra note 50, at 130–32.
58
Harro van Asselt & Joyeeta Gupta, Stretching Too Far? Developing Countries and
the Role of Flexibility Mechanisms Beyond Kyoto, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 311, 337–38 (2009);
Todd B. Adams, Is There a Legal Future for Sustainable Development in Global Warming?
Justice, Economics, and Protecting the Environment, 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 77, 113
(2003).
59
See DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 4, at 414, 417–20.
60
See id.
61
See id. at 421.
62
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2012) (authorizing the EPA to set National Ambient
Air Quality Standards); id. § 7521 (authorizing the EPA to regulate air pollutants from new
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines).
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under the Toxic Substances Control Act, which authorizes regulation of chemical
substances where “there is a reasonable basis to conclude that . . . [they] present[] or
will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.” 63 And risk
assessment is integral to the projection and analysis of environmental impacts under
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other statutes that mandate
environmental assessments. 64
A consideration of the chemical risk assessment process illustrates the
substantial uncertainty risk assessments often involve. Key uncertainties in chemical
risk assessments surround the shape of the dose-response curve, generalizability of
results from animal and in vitro studies to humans, extrapolation from high levels of
exposure studied in controlled experiments to lower levels more typically
encountered outside the lab, variations in individual susceptibility, and effects of
exposure to complex chemical mixtures. 65 The undisputed uncertainty that pervades
chemical risk assessments undermines the value of the data such assessments
generate. Recognizing and communicating these uncertainties to decision makers
and the public is thus critical to informed policymaking. 66
Unfortunately, however, such uncertainties often receive little attention in the
policymaking process. The quantitative analyses typically generated by risk
assessments tend to hinder the consideration of qualitative factors and other
pertinent concerns less amenable to quantification. 67 Even worse, because regulatory
statutes often require a degree of certainty as a precondition to regulate, the mere
presence of uncertainty regarding harm provides a powerful lever for industry to
argue against regulation. 68 Under the law, lack of evidence of risk is typically treated
as evidence of lack of risk. 69
Risk assessments depend on a central assumption: that the study and
quantification of hazards can capture relevant risks with reasonable accuracy. Risk
63

15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2012).
See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (outlining the NEPA requirement that federal agencies
prepare an environmental impact statement); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080 (West Supp.
2014) (setting out the environmental impact analysis requirements of the CEQA).
65
INST. OF MED., ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN THE FACE OF UNCERTAINTY 52–56
(2013).
66
Id. at 181; David Kriebel, How Much Evidence Is Enough? Conventions of Causal
Inference, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 121, 133–35 (2009).
67
See ULRICH BECK, THE RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY 71 (Mark
Ritter trans., 1992) (criticizing assumption of scientific rationality “that so long as risks are
not recognized scientifically, they do not exist—at least not legally, medically,
technologically, or socially, and they are thus not prevented, treated or compensated for”);
SHEILA JASANOFF, DESIGNS ON NATURE: SCIENCE AND DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE AND THE
UNITED STATES 265 (2005) (“In the United States, a preferred method for displaying
objectivity in public decisions has been to clothe the reasons for allocative choices as far as
possible in the language of numbers.”).
68
Kriebel, supra note 66, at 123; see Alyson C. Flournoy, Coping with Complexity, 27
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 809, 819–20 (1994).
69
See Alyson C. Flournoy, Legislating Inaction: Asking the Wrong Questions in
Protective Environmental Decisionmaking, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 327, 366 (1991).
64
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assessments are mythical in that they offer a sense of control, certainty, and
objectivity in situations of ignorance, doubt, and subjective judgment. Thanks to the
numerous sources of uncertainty and subjectivity involved in the assessment
process, one critic goes so far as to assert that risk assessments “generate[] numbers
that are meaningless” and “anything but scientific, objective, and credible.” 70 “The
unreliability of risk assessment is an open secret. . . . This open secret about risk
assessment has not, however, reached the administrative agencies or the courts,
which continue to speak in precise terms about the number of lives purportedly
‘saved’ by various regulations.” 71 In other words, although risk assessments do not
fully or accurately describe the environmental hazards around us, we—society and
its institutions—act as if they do.
D. Regulation Without Regard to Costs
While almost all environmental statutes are in some way concerned with risk,
the standards in some statutes purport to focus solely on risk regardless of economic
costs. Section 109 of the Clean Air Act (CAA), for example, instructs the EPA to
set National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) at a level that “protect[s] the
public health” with “an adequate margin of safety.” 72 Similarly, Section 7 of the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) commands federal agencies to “insure that any
action authorized, funded, or carried out” by them does not jeopardize the continued
existence of any protected species or adversely modify such species’ critical
habitat. 73 Neither of these provisions explicitly mentions costs. 74 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has interpreted both provisions to preclude agencies from taking
costs into account. As to CAA Section 109, the Court declared in Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 75 that it is “fairly clear that [the text of the statute]

70

Mark Eliot Shere, The Myth of Meaningful Environmental Risk Assessment, 19
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 413–14 (1995).
71
Id. at 414.
72
Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012). Prior to the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments, Section 112 of the Act similarly required the EPA to regulate hazardous air
pollutants without regard to cost. See John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation,
17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 237 (1990).
73
Endangered Species Act § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012).
74
There are other statutory provisions that purport to regulate without regard to cost.
Section 101 of the Clean Water Act establishes a “national goal that the discharge of
pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985.” Clean Water Act § 101, 33
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (2012). But cf. Jonathan Remy Nash, Framing Effects and Regulatory
Choice, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313, 340 & n.105 (2006) (describing this language as “a
societal aspiration,” suggesting that the statute does not quite mean what it says (emphasis
omitted)). In addition, the Delaney Clause in the Food and Drug Act prohibits food and color
additives that are found to be carcinogenic. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 348(c)(3)(A), 379e(b)(5)(B)
(2012); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1613, 1668 n.201 (1995).
75
531 U.S. 457 (2001).
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does not permit the EPA to consider costs in setting the standards.” 76 And as to ESA
Section 7, the Court found in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill 77 that the statute
“admits of no exception,” in accord with Congress’ intent “to halt and reverse the
trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.” 78
None of this is to say that costs are irrelevant to the implementation of these
statutes, however. A careful examination of NAAQS implementation under the
CAA, for example, reveals a significant role for costs. 79 The CAA holds states
responsible for achieving the NAAQS by adopting and carrying out state
implementation plans. 80 States may consider claims of infeasibility, as well as costs,
in the course of developing those plans. 81
Furthermore, notwithstanding the text of Section 109, it is virtually inevitable
that the EPA incorporate cost considerations in the course of developing, setting,
and revising NAAQS 82—though the agency emphatically denies doing so. 83 The
76

Id. at 465.
437 U.S. 153 (1978).
78
Id. at 173, 184. The ESA does authorize the government to consider costs in the
designation of critical habitats. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). And a post-Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill amendment to the ESA establishes a procedure for granting exemptions
from the requirements of Section 7(a)(2). See id. § 1536(h).
79
A similar analysis could be undertaken with respect to Section 7 of the ESA. Federal
wildlife agencies have implemented Section 7 in such a way as to avoid many of the
potentially drastic implications of a truly cost-blind approach. For one, the agencies have
interpreted the mandate to avoid adverse modification of critical habitat as redundant with
the mandate to avoid jeopardy. Daniel J. Rohlf, Jeopardy Under the Endangered Species
Act: Playing a Game Protected Species Can’t Win, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 114, 118 (2001). In
addition, for many species, these agencies have made no critical habitat designation at all.
Id. at 117. Furthermore, the rarity of jeopardy findings suggests the wildlife agencies are
reluctant to act on the basis of biological data alone. See id. at 115.
80
42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012).
81
Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 470–71; see David M. Driesen, Should Congress Direct
the EPA to Allow Serious Harms to Public Health to Continue?: Cost-Benefit Tests and
NAAQS Under the Clean Air Act, 11 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 217, 219 (1998) (distinguishing
between consideration of cost when defining “clean air” from consideration of costs when
determining how to reach the NAAQS, and suggesting that the CAA permits the latter, not
the former).
82
Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in
Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1341 n.372 (2004) (listing a multitude of
sources that reach this conclusion).
83
See, e.g., National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 78 Fed.
Reg. 3086, 3089 (Jan. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50–53, 58) (explaining that
the EPA conducted a regulatory impact analysis to provide information on potential costs
and benefits of alternative standards, but affirming “the EPA may not consider the costs of
implementing the standards”); Coglianese & Marchant, supra note 82, at 1269–73
(recounting EPA statements justifying NAAQS revisions in terms of scientific evidence
alone); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV.
303, 317 n.51 (1999) (“[The] EPA’s failure to require more stringent regulation of
particulates provides some evidence of cost consideration.”).
77
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EPA has at least two avenues to consider costs. First, the CAA requires the EPA to
set NAAQS only for criteria pollutants—pollutants that the agency has identified as
“caus[ing] or contribut[ing] to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare” and “the presence of which in the ambient air
results from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources.” 84 Although this
language does not reference costs, it gives the EPA broad discretion to determine
what substances qualify as criteria pollutants in the first instance. 85 The fact that the
EPA has not identified any new criteria pollutants since 1976—when it added lead
to the criteria pollutant list in response to a court order 86—suggests the EPA is
reluctant to act because of the costs that listing a new pollutant might impose. 87
Second, the EPA has repeatedly rejected the option of setting a zero-level standard
for criteria pollutants, notwithstanding the widespread view that many criteria
pollutants have no threshold for safe exposure. 88 Indeed, the House Report on the
1977 CAA Amendments recognized as much, admitting that it is a “necessary myth”
that such pollutants have a safe threshold for exposure. 89 Thus, at least at the
margins, cost considerations and political realities have precluded the EPA from
identifying criteria pollutants and selecting standards that would impose excessive

84

42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A)–(B).
Irma S. Russell, The Sustainability Principle in Sustainable Energy, 44 TULSA L.
REV. 121, 129 (2008) (noting the EPA’s discretion to revise its list of criteria pollutants). In
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, the Second Circuit held the EPA was
required to identify lead as a criteria pollutant. 545 F.2d 320, 324–28 (2d Cir. 1976).
However, the EPA stipulated in that case that lead has an adverse effect on public health and
welfare and that its presence results from numerous or diverse sources. Id. at 324.
86
ARNOLD W. REITZE JR., STATIONARY SOURCE AIR POLLUTION LAW 42 (2005).
87
Cf. Dwyer, supra note 72, at 277–81 (contending a statutory mandate to regulate
based solely on health considerations retards agency standard-setting because the agency
resists literal implementation and seeks to avoid judicial review).
88
Coglianese & Marchant, supra note 82, at 1286 (“It turns out that few, if any, criteria
pollutants regulated under the Clean Air Act exhibit a clear threshold.”); Bill Pedersen &
David Schoenbrod, The Overwhelming Case for Clean Air Act Reform, [2013] 43 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,969, 10,970 (noting that adverse health effects occur at all studied
levels of exposure to fine particulates and ozone); Sunstein, supra note 83, at 317 (suggesting
the EPA’s recognition of economic and social impacts of setting NAAQS at a very low level
causes the EPA to reject a zero-level standard); see also David Schoenbrod, Politics and the
Principle that Elected Legislators Should Make the Laws, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 239,
270 (2003) (“The Clean Air Act is based on the assumption, although we knew at the time it
was inaccurate, that there is a threshold” (quoting Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Envtl. Pollution of the S. Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works,
95th Cong. 8 (1977) (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie))).
89
Coglianese & Marchant, supra note 82, at 1289 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at
111 (1977)).
85
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economic burdens. 90 The EPA’s unspoken contemplation of costs has in turn
distorted the regulatory process and reduced its transparency. 91
The EPA’s implementation of NAAQS operates under the “fundamental fiction
that costs do not and should not enter into the Agency’s decision making.” 92 Does
the EPA’s sub rosa incorporation of cost considerations thereby contravene Section
109 and American Trucking? A more charitable reading of matters would be to
interpret Section 109 as merely precluding judicial review of cost considerations in
the NAAQS-setting process. 93 The statute, in other words, grants the EPA broad
discretion as to costs and neither requires nor prohibits their consideration by the
EPA. “This way,” one commentator suggests, “the agency need not justify how it
takes costs into account and so has maximum flexibility to bend with the changing
political winds.” 94 Consequently, the EPA can cloak its decisions solely in terms of
scientific data and avoid articulating the economic, social, and other factors that are
actually at play. 95 Such an approach may be legally defensible, but it is misleading
to those who take the statute at face value.
The myth of regulation without regard to cost declares that safeguarding public
health and protecting endangered species are of utmost importance, to be pursued
whatever the cost, yet economic considerations ultimately compromise these goals.
The perpetuation of this myth demands an explanation. One possibility proposes that
Congress desires to make a statement on society’s behalf, a symbolic commitment
to protecting human health. 96 A more cynical account might describe the myth as a
form of deception in which Congress and regulators fool the public into believing
that their health and environment are receiving absolute protection based on

90
See id. at 1290; Schoenbrod, supra note 88, at 271 (“[I]t is widely understood that
the [EPA] does consider costs [in setting NAAQS] while maintaining an official posture of
not doing so.”); see also Jason Scott Johnston, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Alternative
Institutions for Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1343, 1365–66 (2002)
(discussing an agency’s incentive to consider and minimize firms’ compliance costs in order
to reduce the likelihood that the firms will challenge a regulation).
91
Coglianese & Marchant, supra note 82, at 1345–46 (asserting that “an open
consideration of costs [in the NAAQS setting process] would not only likely ensure more
cost-effective policy decisions, it would also better serve some of the core principles that
undergird administrative law”); see also Dwyer, supra note 72, at 282 (contending that
unrealistic and “symbolic legislation tends to force an agency to misrepresent its position to
Congress, the courts, and the public”).
92
Coglianese & Marchant, supra note 82, at 1325.
93
Johnston, supra note 90, at 1396–98.
94
Schoenbrod, supra note 88, at 271; see also Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein’s CostBenefit Lite: Economics for Liberals, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 191, 221 (2004) (explaining
Professor Sunstein’s view that statutory standards that incorporate cost-benefit balancing are
more susceptible to legal challenges).
95
Coglianese & Marchant, supra note 82, at 1291–92; Wagner, supra note 74, at 1655–
66.
96
See Dwyer, supra note 72, at 248–49 (discussing idealistic legislation with
unattainable goals that “symbolizes the government’s commitment to certain public values”).
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scientific factors alone. 97 The preceding discussion suggests a further, more nuanced
explanation: the myth shields the agency from judicial review when it exercises
discretion to consider costs. For obvious reasons, the agency may prefer such an
arrangement. Legislators also may find such schemes attractive because they
encourage regulatory targets to direct their attention—and campaign contributions—
to legislators who can intervene on the targets’ behalf.98 And while regulatory targets
might prefer standards that reference cost considerations explicitly, the myth may
serve their interests as well by shielding them from even more stringent or more
readily established standards. 99 In the end, these parties all have a stake in promoting
the myth of regulation without regard to cost.
E. The Sources of Environmental Problems
Just as law defines environmental problems through regulatory schemes and
risk management processes, it also defines the causes of those problems by singling
out targets for regulation. Historically, environmental regulation has focused on
large industrial polluters. 100 For example, the CWA imposes permit and pollution
control requirements on “point sources,” defined as “discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance[s],” like those typically found at a factory or paper mill,101 and
largely gives a pass to other sources of pollution. The CAA allows states some
flexibility in deciding which sources to regulate in order to achieve mandated air
quality standards, but major provisions of the CAA impose permitting requirements
and emissions limits solely on large industrial sources. 102
At the dawn of federal environmental regulation, industrial sources were widely
perceived as the cause of pollution problems, and Congress concentrated on them
accordingly. 103 Several practical reasons explain the continued focus on industrial
sources today: large polluters are generally responsible for substantial pollution,
regulation of a few large sources rather than numerous small sources is simpler and
97

See Wagner, supra note 74, at 1640 (discussing “intentional charade,” where “agency
bureaucrats consciously disguise policy choices as science”); cf. Sunstein, supra note 83, at
315 (noting political dynamic of an era when major federal environmental laws were enacted
“in which citizens wanted air to be ‘safe’ and politicians who failed to respond were at great
risk”).
98
Johnston, supra note 90, at 1400–01.
99
Cf. Wagner, supra note 74, at 1678–81 (discussing delays in promulgating sciencebased standards).
100
Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regulated
Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 524–33 (2004).
101
See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012) (defining point source).
102
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)–(b) (2012) (authorizing the EPA to establish new
source performance standards for categories of stationary sources that contribute
significantly to air pollution and defining stationary source as “any building, structure,
facility, or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant”); id. § 7475 (establishing
preconstruction requirements for new major emitting facilities).
103
See Vandenbergh, supra note 100, at 524, 526 (describing how Congress has
targeted large industrial facilities to achieve its environmental goals).
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often more cost-effective, and direct regulation of individuals may be politically
infeasible. 104 The framing of pollution as primarily an industrial problem shapes the
policy tools lawmakers adopt in response. For instance, the CAA applies
technology-based standards to power plants and automobiles rather than seeking to
limit household energy consumption or individual vehicle use. 105 Similarly, the
CWA imposes technology-based standards on sewage treatment plants rather than
attempting to restrict homeowners’ use of fertilizers or pesticides that end up in
storm sewer systems. 106 And while the emphasis on industrial sources has produced
significant improvements in environmental quality, this somewhat narrow approach
has overlooked opportunities to cultivate changes in practices and values in broader
society. 107
Indeed, environmental law’s focus on industrial sources rests on a myth
regarding the insignificance of individual patterns of behavior to environmental
problems. Nonindustrial sources, including individuals, account for “a large and
growing proportion of” environmental harms. 108 By one estimate, individuals are
responsible for approximately one-third of carbon emissions in the United States, a
share larger than that of industry. 109 Individuals make significant contributions to
other environmental problems as well, including smog, mercury pollution, pesticide
use, and petroleum releases. 110 To complicate the management of such problems,
harms caused by individuals tend to be invisible and involve multiple sources, small
quantities, and cumulative effects. 111
Recognizing the political and practical difficulty of regulating individuals
directly, governments and commentators have looked primarily toward economic
incentives, information provision, and voluntary efforts as means of changing
104

See id. at 598, 617.
See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral
Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1688–89 (2007).
106
See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(B) (2012) (requiring publicly owned treatment works to
adopt secondary treatment standards to further remove water pollutants).
107
Jedediah Purdy, Our Place in the World: A New Relationship for Environmental
Ethics and Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 857, 909 (2013) (“The new environmental laws [enacted in
the 1970s] . . . did little to secure new modes of practice. Working at the scale of the industrial
economy—power-plant emissions, fuel-efficiency standards, pre-use review of toxins, and
ambient pollution standards—these laws made their changes invisible from the point of view
of anyone outside the regulated industries.”); Bradley C. Bobertz, Legitimizing Pollution
Through Pollution Control Laws: Reflections on Scapegoat Theory, 73 TEX. L. REV. 711,
718 (1995) (“[B]ecause we deal harshly with culturally accepted symbols of environmental
problems [such as aerosol cans, toxic waste, and large factories], it is less likely that we will
deal with the problems (and their causes) themselves.”).
108
Vandenbergh, supra note 100, at 534; see also JASON J. CZARNEZKI, EVERYDAY
ENVIRONMENTALISM: LAW, NATURE & INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 33–35 (2011); Hope M.
Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving the Environment: Moving
Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117, 120–21 (2009).
109
Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 105, at 1694.
110
Vandenbergh, supra note 100, at 542.
111
Id. at 589.
105
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individual environmental behavior. 112 However, the existence of littering
ordinances, recycling requirements, and other individual environmental mandates—
particularly at the local level—suggests that in some circumstances at least, direct
regulation of individuals is administratively and politically feasible. 113 Such
regulation may become a more attractive option as new technologies facilitate the
information gathering and enforcement efforts that individual regulation may
require. 114
Unfortunately, environmental law’s focus on industrial sources has perpetuated
and even strengthened the myth that individuals do not contribute significantly to
environmental problems. 115 “Polluters” are responsible for these problems,
individuals are not. 116 This distinction is further engrained through citizen suit
provisions found in many federal environmental statutes. 117 Ostensibly, the plaintiffs
bringing these suits are acting as good citizens to defend the public from the harms
done by industrial polluters. As individuals play an increasingly significant role in
problems ranging from water pollution to climate change, the public’s belief that
individuals are not at fault will hinder their solution.118
F. Sustainability
Finally, the myth of environmental law that has received perhaps the closest
scrutiny is the foundational concept of sustainability. 119 Sustainability generally
refers to the ability to maintain an activity (such as harvesting a resource) or a system
112

Babcock, supra note 108, at 174–75 (advocating a combination of education,
market-based incentives, and shaming to create norms of environmental responsibility); see
generally Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Individual Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging
Fruit, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1705–50 (2008) (identifying individual actions with potential
to achieve large reductions in greenhouse gas emissions).
113
Katrina Fischer Kuh, When Government Intrudes: Regulating Individual Behaviors
that Harm the Environment, 61 DUKE L.J. 1111, 1176–77 (2012) (“Direct regulation of
environmentally significant individual behaviors, although less common than indirect
regulation, occurs daily in a variety of forms in different communities, from recycling laws
to burn limitations to vehicle inspections.”).
114
Id. at 1121–22. Furthermore, designing mandates to avoid imposing
disproportionate or substantial burdens and to limit their intrusion into the home can allay
the objection that such regulation is too invasive. See id. at 1177.
115
Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Environmental Command and
Control, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191, 212–14 (2001) (contending that failure of environmental
law to address individual sources of harm has bolstered the myth that individuals are not
significant sources of harm).
116
Id. at 192–93.
117
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012) (authorizing citizen suits under the Clean Water
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2012) (authorizing citizen suits under the Clean Air Act).
118
See Vandenbergh, supra note 115, at 192–93.
119
Professor Michael Burger has described sustainability as “the most influential
environmental idea of the last 30 years.” Michael Burger, The Story with Sustainability,
[2013] 43 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,356, 10,356.
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over time. The concept is often expressed in terms of sustainable development,
which the Brundtland Commission famously defined as “development that meets
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs.” 120 Another description notes that sustainability “integrat[es]
environmental protection and restoration into economic, social, and national security
decisions and goals.” 121
The sustainability concept exists throughout environmental law. The concept
plays an especially prominent role in international law: it is an animating principle
of the Rio Declaration, 122 Agenda 21, 123 and the Millennium Development Goals; 124
it is reflected in important instruments such as the Framework Convention on
Climate Change 125 and the Convention on Biological Diversity; 126 and it “has
received nearly universal acceptance,” at least rhetorically, “among every sector of
international society.” 127 Direct references to sustainability in domestic
environmental laws can be found in resource management statutes governing the
national forests and other multiple-use public lands. 128 Other environmental statutes
120

Rep. of the World Comm’n on Env’t & Dev., Our Common Future, pt. 1, ch. 2, ¶ 1,
U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (1987) [hereinafter The Brundtland Report], available at
http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/5X6P-ECDG.
121
JOHN C. DERNBACH, ACTING AS IF TOMORROW MATTERS: ACCELERATING THE
TRANSITION TO SUSTAINABILITY 4 (2012).
122
See, e.g., United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de
Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I, princ. 1 (Aug. 12, 1992), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/Z2QS-ZR6U (“Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable
development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.”);
see also id. princ. 3–5, 8.
123
See generally United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio
de Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Agenda 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I),
Annex II (1993), available at http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Age
nda21.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/X6PS-JFVL (emphasizing the importance of
sustainable development).
124
U.N. Dep’t of Public Information, We Can End Poverty: Millennium Development
Goals and Beyond 2015: Goal 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability (Sept. 2013),
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/Goal_7_fs.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Q3Q6FPP6.
125
See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992,
1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (setting out the objective of stabilizing GHG concentrations while
“enabl[ing] economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner”).
126
See United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity art. 1, June 5, 1992, 1760
U.N.T.S. 143 (setting out “sustainable use” of biological diversity as one of the treaty’s
objectives).
127
See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
172 (4th ed. 2011).
128
See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 529 (2012) (directing the secretary of agriculture to administer
renewable surface resources of national forests for multiple use and sustained yield); 43
U.S.C. § 1732 (2012) (directing the secretary of the interior to manage Bureau of Land
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that do not explicitly use the term nevertheless rest on notions of sustainability—for
example, NEPA declares a policy of seeking “to create and maintain conditions
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social,
economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of
Americans.” 129 Indeed, some commentators contend that virtually all major federal
environmental statutes share with sustainability an assumption that “management of
human uses of the environment lies largely within human control” and that the
effects of human activity are generally reversible.130
Various reasons explain the widespread appeal of sustainability and sustainable
development. Sustainability is grounded in a fundamental truth: the Earth has a
limited carrying capacity, and human activity threatens to exceed it.131 More
importantly, sustainable development’s “brilliant ambiguity” 132 enables different
constituencies to read into the concept whatever they find most compelling: it is a
“‘big tent,’ spacious enough to accommodate three usually disparate factions—
development proponents, environmental groups, and social justice advocates.” 133 A
concrete example of sustainability’s unifying force can be found in the Kyoto
Protocol’s CDM, which simultaneously promises growth to developing countries
and environmental salvation (as well as cost savings) to industrialized nations. 134 In
such ways, sustainable development offers to reconcile the interests of present and
future generations and of the rich and poor, assuring us in the meanwhile that we
can have it all. 135
Management (BLM) public lands under principles of multiple use and sustained yield);
Robert L. Glicksman, Sustainable Federal Land Management: Protecting Ecological
Integrity and Preserving Environmental Principal, 44 TULSA L. REV. 147, 156–67 (2008)
(discussing the sustained yield mandates of the Forest Service and BLM).
129
42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2012).
130
Robin Kundis Craig & Melinda Harm Benson, Replacing Sustainability, 46 AKRON
L. REV. 841, 848 (2013).
131
DERNBACH, supra note 121, at 1; Elizabeth Burleson, Climate Sustainability
Through Ethics, Economics, and Environmental Coordination, [2013] 43 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,350, 10,351; Patrick Parenteau, It’s the Biosphere, Stupid, [2013] 43
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,347, 10,347.
132
HUNTER ET AL., supra note 127, at 148.
133
Alison Peck, Sustainable Development and the Reconciliation of Opposites, 57 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 151, 158 (2012); see also Charles A. S. Hall, The Myth of Sustainable
Development: Personal Reflections on Energy, its Relation to Neoclassical Economics, and
Stanley Jevons, 126 J. ENERGY RESOURCES TECH. 85, 86–87 (2004) (noting various
definitions of sustainable development); J.B. Ruhl, Law for Sustainable Development: Work
Continues on the Rubik’s Cube, 44 TULSA L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2008) (observing the varied
meanings of sustainable development).
134
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 43, at art. 12; GRANT A. KIRKMAN ET AL., UNITED
NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, BENEFITS OF THE CLEAN
DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 2012, at 7–10 (2012), available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/about/
dev_ben/about/dev_ben/ABC_2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/F5XF-BU8J.
135
Rebecca M. Bratspies, Sustainability Is the Answer—Now What Was the Question?,
[2013] 43 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,352, 10,352 (“As a marketing ploy,
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Unfortunately, evidence of actual sustainability remains sparse. One popular
measure of sustainability, the ecological footprint, indicates that humans are
consuming the Earth’s resources at a rate fifty percent greater than the rate at which
such resources are being regenerated. 136 Extinction rates as well as data regarding
land use and biomass consumption likewise suggest that sustainability remains a
pious yet possibly unrealistic goal. 137 In the two decades since the concept of
sustainability has come to dominate international environmental law, global
population—and per capita consumption rates—have continued to rise while the
state of the global environment has worsened. 138 The integration of truly sustainable
development into international, national, and local policies has been limited.139 Even
sustainability’s proponents concede the urgent need for wider and more effective
implementation of policies to promote sustainability. 140
Against such facts, the concept of sustainability has come under attack. Over a
decade ago, Professor William H. Rodgers, Jr., attacked “the conviction that gains
from economic development could be enjoyed without sacrifice of the natural
world” as “a convenient, powerful, and serviceable myth [that] . . . happens to be
faulty at its foundations.” 141 More recently, Professor David Barnhizer characterized
sustainability as an “impossible dream” due to its “extraordinary complexity and the
fact that it does not fit how we think and organize . . . [and] because we lack the

sustainability encapsulates our fantasy of a sudden technological breakthrough that will
allow 7 billion, or 10 billion, humans to live the typical American consumption-based
lifestyle, only without destroying the earth in the process.”); Burger, supra note 119, at
10,356 (“Sustainability promises that humanity—operating on scales from global civilization
to local enclaves—can achieve simultaneous economic development, environmental
protection, and social equity, a kind of holistic harmony that requires hard labor but no
sacrifice.”).
136
See World Footprint: Do We Fit on the Planet?, GLOBAL FOOTPRINT NETWORK,
http://www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/GFN/page/world_footprint/, archived at
http://perma.cc/YXT2-WF5K (last updated Mar. 28, 2014). For a summary of environmental
trends in the United States, see DERNBACH, supra note 121, at 15–38.
137
See Parenteau, supra note 131, at 10,347.
138
John C. Dernbach, Navigating the U.S. Transition to Sustainability: Matching
National Governance Challenges with Appropriate Legal Tools, 44 TULSA L. REV. 93, 95–
96 (2008).
139
See F. Biermann et al., Navigating the Anthropocene: Improving Earth System
Governance, 335 SCIENCE 1306, 1306 (2012) (noting that to “steer away from critical tipping
points in the Earth system that might lead to rapid and irreversible change . . . . requires
fundamental reorientation and restructuring of national and international institutions toward
more effective Earth system governance and planetary stewardship”).
140
See, e.g., DERNBACH, supra note 121, at 229–30 (“Achieving sustainability requires
much more rapid progress than we have seen to date.”).
141
William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Myth of the Win-Win: Misdiagnosis in the Business of
Reassembling Nature, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 297, 297 (2000).
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political will to implement [it].” 142 Professor Douglas A. Kysar similarly observed
that sustainability is not only too vague to guide concrete policy choices, but also
stands in an unresolved and unacknowledged conflict with liberal market
economics, in terms of accounting for intergenerational equity, intragenerational
equity, and the effects of liberalized trade regimes. 143 Sustainable development, in
other words, remains rooted in the dominant and environmentally problematic
paradigm of economic growth. 144 Adoption of the concept is potentially
counterproductive because it masks continuing harm and reinforces and perpetuates
existing power dynamics. 145 The concept of sustainability, Professors Robin Kundis
Craig and Melinda Harm Benson argue further, is practically meaningless in the face
of climate change because it calls for maintaining stability in a world of uncertainty
and unavoidable change. 146 Notwithstanding its optimistic promises, Professor
Annie Rochette warns, sustainable development “fails to question the assumption
that continuous economic growth will eventually lead to the destruction of the
planet.” 147 At best, the concept of sustainability represents an unrealistic goal; at
worst, it further entrenches existing beliefs and practices pertaining to production
and consumption.
Even if unattainable, supporters of sustainability nonetheless contend that it
may “provid[e] a powerful ideal and an aspirational goal that, if honestly adhered to

142

David Barnhizer, Waking from Sustainability’s “Impossible Dream”: The
Decisionmaking Realities of Business and Government, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 595,
616 (2006).
143
Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance, 83
TEX. L. REV. 2109, 2117–47 (2005).
144
William E. Rees, The Ecological Crisis and Self-Delusion: Implications for the
Building Sector, 37 BUILDING RES. & INFO. 300, 303 (2009); see also Hall, supra note 133,
at 89 (contending that population and economic growth necessarily “undermine[] future
sustainability because new technologies have not in fact decreased per capita dependence
upon finite resources”); Donald K. Anton, The “Thirty-Percent Solution” and the Future of
International Environmental Law, 10 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 209, 215 (2013) (lamenting
that sustainable development represents a “misplaced faith (or wish) that continued economic
growth and development will drive effective protection of the global environment”).
145
See Barnhizer, supra note 142, at 616; see also Burger, supra note 119, at 10,356
(describing the “sustainability is bad” storyline).
146
Craig & Benson, supra note 130, at 843–44. But cf. Jessica Owley, Adaptive
Management, Resiliency, and Why Sustainability Discussions Give Me a Headache, [2013]
43 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,348, 10,348 (“Climate change does not change our
view of sustainability; it heightens the importance of sustainability thinking.”). Professor
Robin Kundis Craig has advocated that the concept be replaced with the concepts of
adaptability and resilience. Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change Means the Death of
Sustainability, [2013] 43 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,354, 10,355.
147
Annie Rochette, Stop the Rape of the World: An Ecofeminist Critique of Sustainable
Development, 51 U.N.B. L.J. 145, 162 (2002); see also Rees, supra note 144, at 304
(“[T]oday’s global society essentially equates sustainability with maintaining growth
through technological innovation and greater material and economic efficiency.”).
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and pursued, could substantially improve our world.” 148 More than that,
sustainability may be a “vital and necessary” theme to motivate essential changes in
policies and behavior. 149 Towards this end, various commentators have suggested
that sustainability be interpreted as more of a process than a goal: a sustainability
process entails thinking about the future and taking an adaptive approach; 150 more
honestly and thoroughly pursuing economic, environmental, and equitable concerns
into our policies; 151 and replacing a focus on short-term efficiency with attention to
systemic risk. 152
III. A TYPOLOGY OF FAILURES UNDERLYING THE MYTHS
In one way or another, the myths discussed in the preceding Part all involve the
failure of environmental law to achieve its objectives and ideals. Wetlands loss
continues in the United States, albeit at a reduced pace, notwithstanding the
institution of a no net loss policy. 153 Atmospheric GHG concentrations are still rising
steadily despite the establishment of various cap-and-trade systems. 154 People and
the environment continue to be subjected to unregulated and unknown risks despite
the widespread adoption of risk assessment. Regulators persist in taking costs into
account, despite explicit instructions to the contrary. Meanwhile, individuals largely
escape regulation, notwithstanding their significant contributions to environmental
problems. And finally, overall human impacts on the Earth and its life-sustaining
systems have only expanded since the introduction of the concept of sustainable
development. Closer examination reveals two basic types of failures at work:
failures of implementation and conceptual flaws.
A. Failures of Implementation
The above-mentioned failures are in part failures of implementation resulting
from inadequate resources, poor support, technical errors in design, and the like. In
most instances, developing solutions to failures of implementation is conceptually
straightforward—though not necessarily easy in practice. Providing greater
148

Burger, supra note 119, at 10,356.
Id.; see DERNBACH, supra note 121, at 11.
150
Owley, supra note 146, at 10,348–49; see also DERNBACH, supra note 121, at 6–7
(characterizing sustainability as both a destination and a journey).
151
Keith H. Hirokawa, Sustainability as Process: Seeing Climate Change
Opportunities in Sustainability Approaches, [2013] 43 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.)
10,353, 10,353; Ruhl, supra note 133, at 2.
152
David M. Driesen, What Does Sustainability Mean in the Age of Climate
Disruption?, [2013] 43 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,351, 10,352.
153
T.E. DAHL, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., STATUS AND TRENDS OF WETLANDS IN
THE COTERMINOUS UNITED STATES: 2004 TO 2009, at 40–72 (2011) (finding especially
notable losses in salt marsh and freshwater forested wetlands).
154
See EPA, CLIMATE CHANGE INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012 at 16–19 (2d
ed. 2012).
149
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attention, manpower, and funding can address problems of inadequate resources and
support. More careful oversight, monitoring, and enforcement can improve
implementation. Amendments and modifications may alleviate technical errors in
design, as the new wetlands mitigation regulations illustrate. These regulations focus
on wetland functionality rather than acreage, and they attempt to steer compensation
projects to locations where they will best preserve aquatic functions. 155 Similarly,
cap-and-trade regimes can be made more effective by ratcheting down pollution caps
or closing loopholes. Each of these fixes may be politically difficult to achieve, but
is conceptually quite simple.
B. Conceptual Flaws
While problematic, failures of implementation hardly give rise to
environmental myths by themselves. Rather, environmental myths often involve
inherent and more intractable factors as well. For instance, an environmental myth
may involve unavoidable imperfections in translating theory into practice. Risk
assessment, for example, ideally would identify all hazards related to an activity and
provide specific quantitative estimates of their magnitude and probability. This
omniscient sort of risk assessment is impossible, of course. We can never eliminate
uncertainty and ignorance—though our approaches to environmental risk often
assume these phenomena away. Similarly, wetlands mitigation assumes the ability
to identify and replicate all of a wetland’s ecological functions, despite the
impossibility of doing so. 156
Thus, beyond the failures of implementation, environmental myths often
involve conceptual flaws that go to the very heart of the myths. Conceptual flaws
refer to flaws in logic or in the inferential chains that connect a policy measure with
a desired policy outcome. Conceptual flaws make impossible the achievement of
stated objectives, even under conditions of perfect knowledge and fully supported
implementation. A review of the myths described above reveals conceptual flaws at
work with respect to each.
Take the first myth of wetlands mitigation and specifically the use of
preservation measures as a form of mitigation. The acceptance of preservation as
mitigation conveniently ignores the fact that preservation of resource A does nothing
to compensate for the loss of a distinct and separate resource, resource B. The
inevitable result of the tradeoff is a net loss of wetlands. More generally, the
155

See generally Gardner et al., supra note 19, at 221–49 (discussing the extent to which
the regulations reflect the NRC report recommendations); Womble & Doyle, supra note 4,
at 258–60 (discussing watershed approach in the regulations).
156
Under the new regulatory provisions regarding stream mitigation, engineered
streams may serve as mitigation for the loss of existing streams, despite doubts about the
ability of the former to carry out the functions of the latter. See Erik Stokstad, New Rules on
Saving Wetlands Push the Limits of the Science, 320 SCIENCE 162, 162–63 (2008);
Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594, 19,596
(April 10, 2008) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 325, 332) (acknowledging that the “science
of stream restoration is still evolving and that more research is needed”).
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wetlands mitigation program is unlikely to achieve its no net loss goal, as the very
term “mitigation” implies that the measures being adopted only ameliorate—but do
not fully compensate for—the harm being caused.
With respect to the second myth, the trading of pollution credits, the acceptance
of pollution offsets in lieu of allowances involves conceptual difficulties as well. As
explained above, offsets—as opposed to allowances—often arise from activities
whose pollution-reducing benefits are difficult to measure or monitor. But if these
activities are too difficult to quantify for cap-and-trade schemes’ allowance
requirements, it is equally difficult to justify the recognition of offsets for any
asserted pollution reduction benefits from these sources. Unfortunately, the
inclusion of offsets in pollution trading systems can undermine their integrity.
The third myth, risk assessment, fosters an illusory sense of control by
purporting to quantify phenomena that often are not quantifiable. The conceptual
flaw in our use of risk assessment is to assume that the results of risk assessments
fully and accurately account for the hazards that may be present. Although risk
assessment may be the most powerful tool available to analyze health and
environmental hazards, it has important limitations. Such limitations are often
forgotten or ignored in the risk management process, however, when statutes
demand quantification as a prerequisite for oversight and do little to account for
uncertainty.
The fourth myth, regulation without regard to costs, obscures a basic conflict
between modern industrial society and environmental quality. On the one hand, the
language of CAA Section 109 and other cost-disregarding statutes demands absolute
protection of health and the environment. On the other hand, implicit in these statutes
is a baseline understanding that our economy will continue to provide necessary
goods and services (however one defines “necessary”). 157 As much as we might
desire otherwise, in some circumstances it may be impossible to truly protect the
public health with “an adequate margin of safety” 158 without causing severe
economic disruption. We must then choose between the economy and the
environment, and it is a conceptual flaw to assume we can avoid making this choice.
The fifth myth, that individuals do not contribute significantly to environmental
problems, ignores bare facts demonstrating that individual behavior indeed has a
central role in many of our environmental dilemmas. Regulating industry more
stringently, or even absolutely, simply will not solve these dilemmas without
regulating or otherwise changing individual conduct as well.
157

Cf. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 270 n.1 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)
(“What this means in this case, if the allegations of Union Electric Co. prove to be correct,
is that—in the interest of public health—the utility will be ordered to discontinue electric
service to the public. As one cannot believe this would be allowed, I suppose that the State
or Federal Government would find some basis for continuing to operate the company’s
facilities to serve the public . . . .”); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 496
(2001) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Nor need regulation lead to deindustrialization.
Preindustrial society was not a very healthy society; hence a standard demanding the return
of the Stone Age would not prove ‘requisite to protect the public health.’”).
158
42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012).
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Finally, the myth of sustainable development is conceptually flawed in its
inherent inability to resolve conflicts between economic development and ecological
principles. Though more a goal than an operative legal doctrine, the myth is an
important driver of modern environmental law, and its conceptual failures threaten
to undermine the entire enterprise of environmental law. At its core, sustainable
development presumes development: economic growth, increased consumption, and
higher standards of living. Understood as such, development makes increasing
demands on the environment and inevitably requires a sacrifice of the natural world.
Absent a drastic reconceptualization, sustainable development cannot be sustained
indefinitely into the future.
In sum, the conceptual flaws present in the myths of environmental law indicate
that, sociologically, something interesting is at work. The myths do not involve mere
failures in implementation, but rather deliberate deception—and even selfdeception—by society. Most of these myths, moreover, concern an underlying
tension between environmental protection and economic interests. To understand
the functions and social significance of myths, the next Part turns to the general
study of myths in society.
IV. ANALYZING MYTH
A. The Nature of Myth
The environmental myths discussed above hardly resemble the classic stories
that the term “myth” typically evokes. Ancient Greek and Roman myths engaged
gods and heroes in struggles and experiences that carried significance and meaning
beyond their literal plotlines. 159 Likewise, creation myths—think Adam and Eve—
are sacred stories that express important values and beliefs, even if not taken to be
literally true. 160 In contrast, the myths of environmental law do not contain largerthan-life protagonists, nor do they carry the social significance that classical myths
once did or that contemporary myths still carry in more traditional societies. Thus it
would be erroneous to analyze environmental law’s myths in precisely the same way
as anthropologists and sociologists analyze myth.
A closer examination of modern American law, however, reveals numerous
fictitious or mythological elements. Accounts of its origins refer to a purely
theoretical social contract 161 and to larger-than-life Founding Fathers who not only
159

ROBERT A. SEGAL, MYTH: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 4–6 (2004).
PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW 18–19 (1992).
161
Kevin C. Mulder, Note, The Extension of Comity: Fair Assessment in Real Estate
Association v. McNary, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1123, 1123 n.1 (1983) (noting the influence of
political theorists, such as Locke and Rousseau, on the Framers of the Constitution); see LON
L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 98 (1967) (“In theories of the state there appears the constantly
recurring notion of the Social Compact, a notion which perhaps was never given full
credence as a historical fact by anyone, but which has nevertheless had the most profound,
and perhaps beneficial, influence on the history of human thought.”); C. B. Macpherson,
Editor’s Introduction to JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT vi, xxi (C. B.
160
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are pivotal historical figures but also serve as sources of contemporary wisdom. 162
Nor are the mythological aspects of American law confined to stories of its genesis.
Basic doctrines of tort, contract, and criminal law assume the existence of a mythical
reasonable person and impose liability by measuring the conduct of individual
persons against this fictional construct. 163 Similarly, legal fictions of constructive
notice and corporate personhood make presumptions that depart far from reality.
One commentator even argues that law itself has attained a mythic status in
contemporary society as an “autonomous” and “ideal” entity having “quasi-religious
transcendence,” situated both apart from and within society. 164
The pervasive presence of myth in American law suggests the value of looking
beyond the popular usage of the term “myth” merely to refer to something false or
deceptive. Scholars commonly define myth as a story or, more broadly, as a belief
tenaciously held by its adherents. 165 Myths feature personalities—divine, human, or
animal—that may serve as the agents or objects of actions. 166 Yet myths are
distinguishable from simple “lies” or “detached stories.” 167 The narrative of the myth
has a sacred quality, is symbolic in nature, and often contains events and objects that
do not exist in the nonmythical world. 168 Accordingly, myths tend to be
characterized as imaginative and fictional rather than as scientific and historical. 169
At the same time, myths are not purely fictitious, as consideration of the biblical
creation myth illustrates. Many Christians do not take the creation myth to be
literally true. 170 Nonetheless, these adherents accept the myth as containing
important truths about the human condition. 171 Ultimately, myths possess a social
Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690) (noting that Locke’s doctrine “was neatly
and quite properly turned against the British state by the American colonists[, a]nd ever since
. . . it has been an invaluable ideological support for the liberal constitutional state and the
market society on which the liberal state has been built”); see generally LOCKE, supra §§ 6,
95, 123 (focusing on the natural liberty of man and his right not to be governed without
consent); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 9 (Charles Frankel ed., Hafner
Publ’g Co. 1947) (1762) (“[A]ll justifiable authority among men must be established on the
basis of conventions.”).
162
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 590–93 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (referring to intent and understanding of Founding Fathers in interpreting the
Commerce Clause); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213–14 (1963)
(considering the Founding Fathers’ views on religion and religious freedom in applying the
Establishment Clause to Bible readings in public schools).
163
See Douglas Litowitz, The Corporation as God, 30 J. CORP. L. 501, 511 (2005).
164
FITZPATRICK, supra note 160, at x.
165
See WILLIAM G. DOTY, MYTHOGRAPHY: THE STUDY OF MYTHS AND RITUALS 6–7
(2d ed. 2000); SEGAL, supra note 159, at 4–6.
166
SEGAL, supra note 159, at 5.
167
MARY MIDGLEY, THE MYTHS WE LIVE BY 1 (2003).
168
Percy S. Cohen, Theories of Myth, 4 MAN 337, 337 (1969).
169
DOTY, supra note 165, at 7.
170
See Roland Mushat Frye, So-Called “Creation-Science” and Mainstream Christian
Rejections, 127 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 61, 62–63 (1983).
171
See DOTY, supra note 165, at 19.
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significance that ordinary stories do not; one commentator describes myth as “the
legitimation of a social phenomenon by portraying it as natural or inevitable.” 172
Just as myths are distinguishable from mere stories, mythmaking differs from
mere self-deception. Self-deception involves the telling of lies to oneself, and these
lies arguably enable the more effective deception of those around us. 173 To some
degree, the myths of environmental law do involve deception of others and of self.
The actors who make or interpret the laws at hand engage in misleading others in
order to advance their narrow political interests, and, in some instances, those actors
may sincerely accept the suppositions underlying the myths. The deep-rooted nature
of these myths suggests that more than mere deception is at work here, however.
While mythmaking may involve the telling of lies, it also incorporates “enduring
human truths,” 174 as myths are experienced “as both true and crucial to those who
perceive through [them] their experienced world.” 175 Myths are often existential in
nature and typically concern matters of individual and social significance. 176 These
characterizations of myth arguably fit many of the myths of environmental law, as
will be explained further below.
Finally, myths can be distinguished not only from stories and self-deception but
also from legal fictions. Well-known legal fictions include the personhood of
corporations, which treats corporations for certain legal purposes as if they were real
persons, and the attractive nuisance doctrine, which posits a fictional invitation to
children to visit a defendant’s premises. 177 “The classic common law legal fiction
treat[s] as true a factual assertion that plainly [is] false, generally as a means to avoid
changing a legal rule that require[s] a particular factual predicate for its
application.” 178 In contrast to a myth, a legal fiction is obviously not true, and
everyone knows it. 179 Another distinction lies in the fact that legal fictions are
primarily the domain of courts—i.e., courts use these fictitious suppositions to
modify or refuse to modify existing legal rules. 180 By comparison, a wider range of
actors, including legislatures, agencies, and policymakers, engage in constructing
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Thomas W. Joo, Narrative, Myth, and Morality in Corporate Legal Theory, 2009
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1091, 1096.
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OF THE SELF 11 (1993).
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DOTY, supra note 165, at 14 (emphasis omitted).
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Donald C. Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriously: An Essay for Lawyers, 74 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1569, 1569 n.1 (2000).
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FULLER, supra note 161, at 12.
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Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1437 (2007).
179
See FULLER, supra note 161, at 9 (defining legal fiction as “either (1) a statement
propounded with a complete or partial consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false statement
recognized as having utility”); Nancy J. Knauer, Legal Fictions and Juristic Truth, 23 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 1, 6 (2010).
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See Smith, supra note 178, at 1441. But cf. Knauer, supra note 179, at 17 (noting
use of legal fictions in statutes and regulations in addition to their use by courts).

74

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

and perpetuating legal myths. Notwithstanding their falsity, legal fictions remain
useful in enabling the application of law to new or difficult circumstances. 181
Moreover, the semblance between legal fictions and legal myths suggests that the
latter may have some utility as well, and perhaps to a broad array of interests in
society.
B. Functions of Myth
Mythography—the study of myths and their functions—can facilitate a deeper
understanding of environmental myths, their roles, and their persistence. This
section highlights the most pertinent of the functions of myths that scholars have
identified. These functions include explaining natural phenomena, expressing social
attitudes, legitimating social institutions, and promoting administrative efficiency.
1. Myth as Explanation
Creation myths illustrate that myths can furnish explanations for how things
came to be, provide interpretive frames for understanding, and offer potential
avenues for controlling external events. 182 In their explanatory and event-shaping
role, these sorts of myths function in a manner akin to science and are sometimes
branded as a primitive counterpart to modern science.183
This skeptical and somewhat condescending view of myth, however, does not
reflect the full social context in which myths exist.184 It also fails to account for the
persistence of myth in modern, “enlightened” society. 185 Rather than substituting for
science, myth may serve as an alternative yet not exclusive means of “rationaliz[ing]
complexity.” 186 Whereas science explains through objective experimentation and
hypothesis testing, myth “attempt[s] to express the quality and range of human
existence, its emotional, aesthetic, and moral aspects.” 187 Myth “provid[es] the
illusion of rational intention and action[,] . . . creat[es] predictability in the face of
random and evolutionary forces[,]” 188 and fosters acceptance of uncontrollable
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phenomena such as natural disasters and death. 189 Viewed in this regard, science and
myth are complementary and somewhat overlapping. Indeed, science itself may be
viewed as a mythological system “tied to all the imagery and promise of progress,”
and individual scientific theories as individual myths not subject to indisputable
proof. 190
Myth’s persistence in the face of modern rationality nonetheless calls for
further discussion. At a personal level, cognitive psychology offers one account for
why we accept mythical explanations: uncertainty generates stress and anxiety that
myths can ease by offering order and predictability. 191 In particular, self-serving
biases give rise to stories and myths that “inflate feelings of efficacy and control,”
and these biases come to permeate our judgments and decisions.192 Ultimately,
rationality does cabin our willingness to accept myth, especially when we receive
immediate and unambiguous negative feedback to mistaken myths. But when the
consequences of adhering to myths are uncertain, myths tend to persist. 193
Environmental problems frequently involve substantial uncertainty 194 and thus
provide fertile ground for myth to flourish.
In recognizing the explanatory functions of myth, it should be emphasized that
myths provide more than mere illusions of control. Myths can serve as a means of
mediating otherwise unresolvable contradictions. 195 Most pertinent to
environmental law’s myths is that humans experience a fundamental contradiction
between nature and culture, existing as a part of the natural world yet also standing
outside it and seeking to control it.196 In this context, myths can enable tolerance of
such contradictions or even appreciation of the impossibility of resolving them. 197
Furthermore, myths can provide socially valuable knowledge, “not so much the
knowledge of the scientific laboratory as the knowledge of communal experience
that has proved itself useful and nurturing.” 198
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2. Expressive and Legitimizing Functions of Myth
Explanation is an important function of myth, but not the only one. Sociological
theories of myth explore the social functions of myth—namely, myth’s role in
expressing social attitudes and values, legitimating social institutions and practices,
and creating and maintaining social solidarity. 199
Myth can have an expressive function at an individual or societal level. At an
individual level, myths may operate in a manner akin to the making of music:
mythmaking can be an end in itself, an emotional and creative expression of the
individual. 200 At a societal level, myths can serve as descriptive or normative
expressions of values. 201 Descriptively, myths may reflect shared values, social
hierarchies, and other elements of the existing social order. 202 Normatively, myths
may “support[] particular types of behavior and association [while] rejecting other
exemplary models.” 203
Perhaps the most important expressive function of myths is to legitimate
existing social practices and institutions. This is often accomplished by connecting
present practices with the past or with a higher order. 204 Through appeals to tradition
and long-standing practice, myths provide a justificatory explanation for social
institutions and phenomena. 205 In fulfilling such functions, myths intertwine with
the exercise of power, as well as the struggle for power. Dominant interests may use
myths to defend the status quo or justify self-serving actions, whereas opposing
interests may employ myths to motivate resistance.206 The critical theory approach
to myth emphasizes the role of mythology in legitimating social injustices.207 In this
role, myth “presents the current world as the only possible world, papering over the
historical struggles that simmer beneath the surface,” and “consecrates the existing
order as common sense, thereby disabling alternatives.” 208 The psychological
tendency to expect just outcomes suggests that people are especially receptive to
myths supporting the existing order. 209
An overlapping function of myth is the maintenance of social solidarity: myth
serves “as social glue and a major source of cultural identity.” 210 This function is
199
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often expressed through ritual, including legal rituals such as wedding vows or
Miranda warnings. 211 Myth generally differs from ritual in that the former involves
a statement and the latter an action. 212 Nonetheless, ritual may be viewed as the
application of myth in an effort to control external events or relieve social
tensions. 213 The content of the myth or ritual reflects social values and structures. 214
The truth of the myth or ritual, however, is less important than the belief in its
underlying values. 215 Thus, a ritual as described may differ substantially from actual
behavior, and participants in a ritual may openly acknowledge its inefficacy in
controlling external events. 216 In hunting societies, for example, hunters often depart
from the ritual proscriptions they claim to follow.217 In such circumstances, ritual
represents an idealized account that “highlight[s] the incongruities between the
actual and the ideal.” 218 Modern myths, such as the “rags to riches” theme embedded
in American culture, similarly set out ideals that reality may not reflect. Likewise,
the ritual of giving Miranda warnings apparently does little to achieve its express
purpose of reducing coerced confessions. 219 These myths and rituals nevertheless
affirm basic values that forge social identity and define social structure. 220
3. Practical Functions of Myth
Finally, myths may serve practical goals such as promoting administrability. 221
Professor Peter J. Smith offers as examples the judicial reliance on modern myths
regarding eyewitness identifications and jury instructions. 222 Notwithstanding
empirical evidence indicating that eyewitness identifications are unreliable, judges
routinely exclude expert testimony to that effect. 223 Likewise, judges rely heavily on
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jury instructions despite evidence that they are often ineffective. 224 In both instances,
courts apparently deem the practical consequences of relinquishing the myths—
countless minitrials on the reliability of individual pieces of evidence or a
proliferation of mistrials—as simply too damaging to the administration of justice
and the functioning of the legal system. 225
The multiple functions of myth underscore the distinction between myths and
mere stories. Myths, unlike stories, are socially significant beliefs that mediate
relationships among humans and their institutions and between humanity and the
external environment.
V. APPLYING MYTHOGRAPHY TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
What does the study of myth reveal about the myths of environmental law?
Like the myths examined by sociologists and anthropologists, the myths of
environmental law explain the world around us, express social values, and legitimize
social, legal, and economic arrangements.
A. Myth as Explanation
As described above, myths explain, typically by setting out a narrative, an
ordering of events. 226 The biblical Garden of Eden and other creation myths provide
an obvious example of myth as narrative: they offer an account of how things came
to be and why things are the way they are. Environmental law, which seeks to
mediate the relationship between humans and the external environment, possesses
its own secular counterpart to the Garden of Eden: the wilderness narrative, which
depicts a time and state prior to human presence and activity. 227 Both expressive and
explanatory in nature, the wilderness narrative reflects “core values such as
authenticity, freedom and purity.” 228
The myth of sustainable development serves a function similar to creation
myths: it relates human beings to the rest of the universe, though in a different
timeframe. In contrast to the wilderness narrative, which concerns idealized origins,
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the sustainable development narrative points toward an idealized future. 229
Specifically, sustainable development describes a path to a state in which humans
live in harmony with nature; it offers a redemptive vision of how humanity can enjoy
the fruits of economic development without destroying the natural systems essential
to such development and to life. Acknowledging the impossibility of returning to an
Edenic paradise, sustainable development nevertheless suggests the possibility of
peaceful coexistence.
Other myths of environmental law are explanatory in that they assume—and
present as true—a reductionist account of ecologically complex systems.
Compensatory mitigation schemes rest on simplifying assumptions regarding the
functional equivalence of existing wetlands and newly created ones. These schemes
assume a seemingly heroic capacity to identify and reproduce all relevant wetland
functions, yet at the same time they undervalue the environmental context in which
specific wetlands exist.230 Carbon trading systems similarly involve drastic
simplifications of complexity. In theory, carbon trading is attractive because climate
change effects are indifferent to the exact location of carbon emissions, and trading
schemes capitalize on the market’s ability to identify where emissions reductions
can occur at lowest cost. In practice, however, complex systems of offsets and
allowances are riddled with difficulties—conceptual and in implementation—that
undercut the promised benefits of carbon trading schemes.
Both pollution control schemes focused on industrial polluters and regulatory
efforts premised on quantitative risk assessment techniques likewise rest on
reductionist accounts. These myths bracket and disregard hazards or concerns that
policymakers deem too difficult to address. The CWA and CAA hone in on major
industrial sources, largely ignoring the significant contributions of individuals and
other small sources. 231 This seemingly reasonable approach fails to capture the
complexities of pollution problems and does little to address the underlying social
processes that generate pollution. 232 Similarly, substantial uncertainties pervade the
risk assessment process, yet existing regulatory schemes generally give them little
or no weight. 233 Such schemes proclaim established, quantified risks to be the only
hazards worth worrying about, and assume away the existence of other, uncertain
and therefore invisible hazards. 234 These schemes also treat each source of risk as
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discrete and thereby disregard cumulative and synergistic effects that would
complicate regulatory oversight. 235
In each of these areas—wetlands mitigation, carbon markets, pollution control,
and risk management—prediction plays a central role. Indeed, almost all of
environmental law depends heavily on prediction, whether in anticipating the effects
of development projects, determining whether an action will jeopardize a protected
species, or constructing models for combating air or water pollution. Yet, as
Professor Rodgers has observed: “In the art of predicting, self-deception is given
free reign, especially as time-frames are stretched out, complicating factors are
multiplied and condition-dependent qualifiers are enacted.” 236 The self-deception
reflected in environmental myths flourishes amid the uncertainty and complexity
surrounding environmental problems and the difficulty of detecting and measuring
environmental harm. 237
The reductionism common to these myths runs counter to the foundational
insights of ecology. Ecology teaches that the environment consists of complex,
interconnected, and dynamic systems that are more than the sum of their parts. 238
Indeed, the “uncertainty and unpredictability [of the environment] are inherent
limitations on the legal system’s ability to perfectly control and regulate its
subjects.” 239 The myths embodied in reductionist accounts may make the challenges
of environmental regulation more manageable, but they leave our regulatory regimes
vulnerable to surprise and error. 240
One danger consequently posed by explanatory myths is that we will lose sight
of the complexities leading to the myths. Compounding that danger are the
incentives of vested interests to promote explanatory myths that weaken the case for
careful oversight. However, laws and policies can be modified to counter these
concerns. Thus, while risk assessment is essential to the management of toxic risks,
such management should consider and in some instances act upon the uncertain
hazards that risk assessment fails to quantify. Similarly, the tradeoffs reflected in
wetlands mitigation schemes may be worthwhile from society’s perspective, but the
loss of natural wetlands should be understood as the loss of a unique resource and
not as the loss of a commodity that can be readily exchanged and replaced. Even the
235
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concept of sustainable development poses the danger of oversimplification and
warrants close scrutiny. From one point of view, sustainable development articulates
an idealized, vastly improved relationship between humanity and nature.
Nonetheless, the concept fails to question the necessity for development itself and
threatens to lead to a state of affairs that is not truly sustainable.
B. The Expressive Functions of Environmental Myths
Laws do not merely govern behavior; they also express social values.241 More
than declarative statements, these expressions reinforce, change, or create social
norms. 242 Specific examples from environmental law include the Endangered
Species Act, which represents “a certain conception of the relationship between
human beings and their environment,” and mandatory recycling laws, which make
a social statement regarding recycling’s importance. 243
More generally, Professor Bradley C. Bobertz has sketched out an expressive
theory of environmental law that highlights its “scapegoating” function. 244 This
theory proposes that environmental laws scapegoat industry and other readily
identifiable sources of pollution, thereby externalizing blame for pollution on
outside forces. 245 This scapegoating process reinforces the myth that individuals are
not a significant cause of environmental problems and allows “us”—the individuals
whose activities are ultimately responsible for the pollution—to continue with our
environmentally destructive lifestyles. 246
Other myths of environmental law express social values as well. Emissions
trading systems provide an instructive example. These market-based mechanisms
arguably set forth a particular conception of the environment as a commodity,
leading many in the environmental community to object to them. 247 Some critics
argue that the commodification of emissions is intrinsically problematic in that it
expresses an inaccurate or wrongful view of environmental pollution.248 Others
argue that the commodification of emissions undermines social norms of
environmental protection, particularly the norm that pollution deserves moral
condemnation. 249 Indeed, while emissions trading schemes could be viewed as
condemning pollution sources for imposing environmental externalities, the ease
with which polluters can atone for those externalities—by holding or obtaining
allowances—suggests that any condemnation is little more than a slap on the wrist.
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Pollution trading systems not only express views about the environment as a
commodity; they also make statements about different sources of pollution through
offset provisions and the like. On the one hand, carbon offset mechanisms
incorporate many pollution sources otherwise excluded from regulation, thereby
sending a message about the significance of these various sources in contributing to
climate change. 250 On the other hand, the favorable treatment these sources often
receive implies that emissions from these sources are not very important.
Furthermore, the willingness to credit offsets for questionable emission reductions—
a particularly mythical aspect of these schemes—makes a mockery of more direct
but costly efforts to reduce emissions. Notwithstanding offsets’ dubious
environmental benefits and the difficulties in their implementation, carbon emission
trading systems continue to use them widely. This fact ultimately reveals society’s
unwillingness to undertake serious emission reductions, as well as its reluctance to
admit to this unwillingness.
The law’s use of risk assessment likewise conveys a message regarding the
risks that matter to society. The predominant legal treatment of risk, under which
safety is assumed in the absence of demonstrated risk, declares that uncertain risks
simply do not matter. In addition to offering an illusory sense of control and
objectivity, such an approach affirms innovation, entrepreneurship, and
experimental endeavors. 251 Yet as the myth of regulation without regard to cost
suggests, even risks that are demonstrated to be significant may not matter to us as
much as we claim they do. Consider the history of regulation under CAA Section
109. 252 The text of the statute focuses solely on protecting public health with “an
adequate margin of safety,” without regard to cost, feasibility, or other factors. 253 By
enacting this law, Congress asserted the imperative of protecting public health and
the environment, while condemning polluters and their activities. 254 The fact that the
EPA considers costs, notwithstanding this imperative, reveals a society torn between
protecting health and avoiding substantial economic costs. When forced to choose
between the two, society almost invariably favors economic interests, or at least
gives them significant weight.255 At the same time, the myth of regulation without
250
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regard to cost enables society to pay lip service to health and environmental
concerns. As one commentator bluntly characterized this tension, “We wish to
exorcise our demons, but still retain the pleasures of their company.” 256
Finally, the myth of sustainable development may be best understood in terms
of its expressive function. No one would seriously contend that sustainable
development accurately describes present practices. Nonetheless, numerous treaties,
laws, and official documents proclaim sustainable development as an important
goal. Sustainable development expresses society’s aspiration for achieving balance:
balance between present generations and future generations, and balance between
humanity and nature. These are goals society can agree on, even if the means for
achieving these goals remain uncertain or controverted.
One might argue, moreover, that sustainable development may be a useful
framework even if it represents an unrealizable ideal. Sustainable development
could serve as a catalyst for radical and necessary changes if it were to prompt a
wholesale reconsideration of problematic systems and processes. 257 Short of that, it
could still bring about significant improvements to our world if honestly pursued. 258
Unfortunately, however, sustainable development is unlikely to prompt a drastic
reconsideration of the status quo. Rooted in the dominant paradigm of economic
growth, sustainable development proclaims that capitalism and globalization can
continue, albeit with a few tweaks. 259 These tweaks may reduce the damage inflicted
on the environment at the margins, but in reality will not be enough to stave off
climate change or other looming ecological disasters. Ultimately, sustainable
development not only reinforces environmentally problematic practices, but even
blesses economic systems and growth imperatives that have caused tremendous
environmental damage. 260
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C. The Legitimizing and Ritualistic Functions of Environmental Myths
Indeed, the myth of sustainable development illustrates how the explanatory
function of environmental legal myths intersects with their legitimizing and
ritualistic functions. Retracing the history of sustainable development, Professor
Donald K. Anton argues that the concept gradually has been “co-opted by
environmentally ambivalent or hostile agendas” into a philosophy for continued
economic growth. 261 Sustainable development simultaneously expresses a societal
goal; explains how to achieve that goal; and legitimizes systems of capitalism,
economic development, and consumerism as consistent with the goal. Thus,
sustainable development’s descriptive explanation of how things are, as well as its
normative account of how things should be, reinforces existing social practices and
institutions.
The myth that individuals are not a significant cause of environmental problems
similarly legitimizes the status quo. The myth instructs that environmental problems
can be resolved by regulating utilities, manufacturers, businesses, government
agencies, and other nations—anyone but ourselves. The reality is that individuals
contribute to these problems through their personal patterns of behavior as well as
their participation in global economic and social systems. 262 Yet like sustainable
development, the myth of individual insignificance reassures us that personal
sacrifices for the common good or for the future are not necessary. Rather, by
shifting the regulatory burden to others, we can have our cake and eat it too.
Other environmental myths also legitimize activities that might otherwise be
subject to societal condemnation. Laws that prohibit the destruction of wetlands or
other habitat express a valuation for these environmental goods and condemn their
destruction. For actors who undertake these destructive activities, however,
mitigation programs offer a form of penance. 263 The frequent failure of mitigation
to truly make up for resource damage suggests that these programs have aims apart
from ensuring no net harm to the environment. These programs have an important
ritualistic purpose as well: mitigation offers a means for reintegrating into good
society the offender of environmental norms.
A similar analysis applies to pollution trading programs. These programs
recognize pollution as harmful and perhaps even wrongful, but offer a ritual—the
possession and eventual surrender of allowances—to absolve polluters of their
wrongs. This is not to say that these programs are solely ritualistic. If properly
implemented, they can make strides towards reducing pollution. The incorporation
of offsets into such programs, however, has tended to undermine their environmental
effectiveness and indicates that goals other than pollution reduction are also at work.
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As mythographic analysis reveals, these programs gently condemn various sources
of pollution while simultaneously offering a method for erasing that condemnation.
Risk assessment is yet another form of ritual. Risk assessments are of course
essential to the rational operation of environmental law and other bodies of
regulatory law. They enable the development of protective measures and rules to
address identified risks and, more rarely, lead to the prohibition of activities deemed
to be too hazardous. At the same time, risk assessments also serve to legitimize the
activities of modern industrial society. Incorporated into the risk management
process, risk assessments declare that such activities may continue, subject to some
limits. In this context, risk assessments become important rituals for describing the
indescribable and controlling the uncontrollable.
Professor Bobertz contends that environmental lawmaking in general has
become a ritual for expiating our collective guilt for destroying our environment:
Without commonly accepted religious ceremonies to expiate guilt,
Americans turn instead to the sanctifying rituals of lawmaking. . . . In
environmental law, we have our own sacred clerics, scapegoats, and rites
of redemption, even though they inhabit the seemingly asectarian world of
law and politics. Indeed, the inherent spiritualism associated with nature
provides a special religiosity to environmental lawmaking, as twenty-five
years of incantatory rhetoric from the mouths of our leaders amply
prove. 264
The environmental laws we have enacted—like the concept of sustainable
development—allow us to avoid questioning the fundamental processes of
capitalism and consumerism that drive modern society. 265
Indeed, reflection on the environmental myths discussed above reveals that in
one way or another, each myth facilitates the continuation of “business as usual.”
Wetland mitigation programs, carbon cap-and-trade systems, risk assessment, and
even sustainable development largely do not disturb existing economic practices.
The myths of regulation without regard to cost and of individual insignificance
likewise mask the absence of the radical transformation that may be needed. While
softening the sharpest edges of existing practices and extracting modest
compensation in the process, all these myths leave intact the global systems of
production and consumption that are at the root of many environmental problems.
Moreover, by regularizing market exchanges of environmental amenities, these
myths further strengthen the capitalist foundations of modern society. Monetization
of environmental resources becomes a norm, as does the assumption that resources
are fungible, subject to exchange for other environmental—or nonenvironmental—
resources. The result is an even greater dominance of environmental law by a
264
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market-based, consequentialist paradigm featuring cost-benefit analysis as its
leading analytical tool.266
VI. IMPLICATIONS
Myth’s common presence in environmental law and beyond suggests that the
existence of myth may be inevitable. Myths offer an empowering response to the
unavoidable uncertainty societies and individuals face in confronting environmental
problems and other challenges. If myths are inevitable, what can or should we do
about them? This Part offers several recommendations: developing a greater
awareness of myth in environmental law, addressing shortcomings in the law
thereby revealed by applying an “Environmental Hippocratic principle,” and
rejecting or replacing those myths that undermine environmental law’s goals.
A. Awareness of Myth and Lessons for Existing Environmental Law
Notwithstanding its critical tone, this Article does not seek to discredit
environmental law or to call for its complete overhaul. Environmental law has halted
or reversed many destructive trends and provides important protections to public
health and the environment. It is flawed, but perhaps no more so than other areas of
law.
An awareness of the myths at work in environmental law, however, can enable
stronger implementation of existing laws and better design of future laws. In some
instances, the myths describe failures in implementation. To fix these failures is
conceptually easy, though perhaps politically difficult. 267 Even where conceptual
flaws are at work, there may be ways to counter some of the law’s shortcomings. In
wetlands mitigation, for example, demanding higher mitigation ratios can increase
the likelihood that mitigation projects will effectively compensate for the functions
lost through the destruction of a natural wetland. Likewise, discounting of carbon
offsets can reflect the uncertainty that the offsets actually represent avoided or
reduced carbon emissions. Implementing and monitoring stringent certification
requirements for offsets also can promote offset integrity. 268
Moreover, a healthy appreciation of environmental law’s myths can prompt
more vigorous engagement with the problems that the law seeks to address. We can
ask probing questions and have a more transparent dialogue about the means and
ends of environmental law. 269 With respect to statutes that purport to regulate
without regard to cost, for instance, we might debate the desirability of eliminating
particular risks without considering the price of doing so. On the one hand, the cost-
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benefit paradigm that dominates modern policy discourse makes the weighing of
costs seem natural. On the other hand, the language of cost-blind statutes has an
appealing ring to it, absolute and almost rights-like in nature. Contemplating what
the CAA seeks to achieve may initiate a process of eventually recognizing a right to
clean air or other environmental goods. 270 Similarly, the ESA might be read to imply
a right of individual plant and animal species to exist.271
Likewise, deconstructing the myth of sustainable development can lead us to
reconsider the fundamental assumptions that underlie our modern economic and
social systems. In addition to adopting concrete measures that actually are
sustainable, we might think about alternatives to sustainability. Rather than taking a
“cradle to grave” approach to designing products and processes, innovators might
take a “cradle to cradle” approach in which products and their components are
designed with repurpose and reuse in mind. 272 Beyond that, we might reevaluate the
adequacy of income, wealth, and consumption as indices of national and global wellbeing and look instead to alternatives that can better measure life satisfaction and
quality of life. 273 We might even question the imperative of economic growth and
ponder what sort of society and world we want to live in. 274
Ultimately, awareness of the myths of environmental law at least can cultivate
a healthy skepticism toward the legal solutions we adopt. The myths remind us that
law serves not only as a system for organizing behavior towards social ends, but also
as an exercise of political power by competing interests. Awareness of the myths of
environmental law can also engender a fitting sense of humility. No matter the effort
and resources that society pours into risk assessments, pollution trading systems, and
the like, environmental law cannot control all aspects of the natural world. We
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should expect surprises and accordingly temper our actions, while developing
capabilities of resilience. 275
B. Developing and Applying an Environmental Hippocratic Principle
Further, our appreciation of the myths of environmental law may warrant the
application of a general rule of thumb for dealing with environmental problems. The
environmental myths reveal the shortcomings of the tools of environmental law:
mitigation schemes fail to make up for lost resources, risk assessments fail to
account for relevant hazards, and cost considerations dilute nominally health-based
standards. One means of countering these shortcomings is to apply to environmental
policymaking processes a presumption in favor of less disruptive and less harmful
actions. Such a presumption would recognize the seemingly inevitable slippage that
occurs when valuable environmental resources are destroyed. We might call this
presumption the Environmental Hippocratic principle: avoiding harm to the
environment to the extent possible. 276
How might this principle be implemented in a concrete way? The mitigation
sequence for CWA Section 404 provides a useful starting point to consider:
applicants are to first seek to avoid impacts, then to minimize impacts that are
unavoidable, and finally to compensate for impacts that remain. 277 In contrast to
current practice, however, compensatory mitigation should be treated as a last resort,
rather than as an option readily subject to government approval.
Similarly, the federal government might apply the Environmental Hippocratic
principle to its planning processes under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA). As written, NEPA requires the federal government to analyze the
environmental impacts of its actions and to consider a reasonable range of alternative
actions, including a no-action alternative; it does not mandate any substantive
result. 278 Forceful application of the Environmental Hippocratic principle could give
rise to a substantive requirement that the government adopt less environmentally
destructive actions that achieve a desired goal in lieu of more destructive
alternatives. 279 But even a more modest application of the principle could have
275
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positive effects by requiring the government to take a hard look at less
environmentally destructive alternatives and if appropriate, to justify their rejection.
The Environmental Hippocratic principle could apply to risk management
decisions as well and help to recognize the limitations of risk assessment. One
concrete way of doing so would be to incorporate a preference for options involving
greater environmental certainty over those involving lesser certainty into risk
management decisions. Such a preference could be considered along with other,
more typical decision-making criteria. Current environmental policy discussions
already reflect this preference to some degree. For example, one reason for climate
change policymakers to prefer mitigation over adaptation is the greater uncertainty
associated with adapting to new and indeterminate climate regimes. 280 Similarly, in
geoengineering policy debates, the general preference for carbon dioxide removal
techniques—which reduce atmospheric carbon concentrations—over solar radiation
management techniques—which seek to block solar radiation but do nothing to
reduce carbon concentrations—reflects a preference for greater environmental
certainty. 281 Such a preference could be applied in other environmental policy areas
as well. For example, all else being equal, chemical regulation could favor the use
of well-studied substances with no known harmful effects over substances with little
toxicity data.
Another approach would be to identify a policy option’s consequences that are
plausible yet unacceptable, to give weighted consideration to those consequences,
and perhaps even to prefer options that avoid those consequences. 282 Applying just
such an approach to climate change, Professor Daniel A. Farber argues that
“[c]limate policy cannot be based simply on the outcomes we consider most likely,”
but must find a way to “take seriously that there is even a small possibility that
climate change could wipe out our present society.” 283 Under this analysis, strong
mitigation efforts would be justified even if most people believe catastrophic climate
consequences unlikely. 284
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C. Developing Better Myths
Finally, armed with our understanding of the importance of myths, we should
develop new, more functional myths. Legal myths create and reinforce perceptions
of reality: the law’s focus on industrial polluters has reinforced the myth that
individuals do not contribute significantly to environmental problems, just as
mitigation schemes have bolstered the assumption that environmental resources are
readily fungible. In some instances, deconstructing the myth and removing its traces
from the law may suffice. For example, reducing or eliminating the use of carbon
offsets could be an adequate response to the questionable emissions reductions
associated with these offsets. In other instances, however, further actions may be
necessary. As the concept of sustainable development illustrates, myths can be
powerful narratives that attract support, become incorporated into law, and motivate
action, notwithstanding the fictions that lie just beneath the surface. At the heart of
the sustainable development myth is not only a conceptual error, but also a broad
paradigm for all human activity.
We will have to cultivate more compelling and powerful narratives to displace
foundational myths like sustainable development. 285 Sustainable development
seems to have lost much of its value as a driving force for the changes needed to
address environmental threats. 286 It nonetheless fills a deep need for a way to
conceptualize the relationship between humanity and the environment. We must
brainstorm and explore alternative ways of thinking about this relationship, perhaps
building on existing ideas—whether Gaia theory, 287 creation myths, or other
notions—or constructing myths that are completely new. Ultimately, coming up
with a successor to sustainable development and other myths is no easy task and lies
beyond the scope of this Article. But it is essential for scholars and practitioners of
environmental law and environmentalism to take on this challenge in the years
ahead.
VII. CONCLUSION
Myths are widespread in environmental law. While it may be tempting to
dismiss their significance, these myths explain ecologically complex systems,
express social values, and reinforce social structures and economic systems.
Moreover, the myths of environmental law involve more than easily fixed errors in
legal design, mere shortcomings in implementing the law, or harmless stories
concerning the world around us. The myths rest on conceptual flaws that make
impossible the achievement of specific statutory and societal goals. Indeed, the
conceptual flaws themselves reveal disguised policy choices and unresolved
conflicts that threaten the entire enterprise of environmental law. Deconstructing and
285
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understanding the myths is an important first step towards countering this threat.
Moving beyond these myths and, where appropriate, constructing new myths will
be critical for the future of environmental law and humanity’s relationship with the
natural world.

